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Saraki to Abdulrahman: Kwarans Can’t Be Cowed By This Wave of Demolition Exercise

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Ordinarily, some people would expect that I would be indifferent to the weekend demolition of the Crystal Place, a shopping mall on Sulu Gambari Road in Ilorin, ordered by the government of Kwara State, because of the political relationship between me and the owner, Hon. Moshood Mustapha, who after serving as my commissioner, Special Adviser, and House of Representatives member under the platform of our party defected to the All Progressives Congress (APC) and has worked against our structure since 2018.

However, it is not my style to take positions on issues from the narrow, parochial perspective. It is my view that one should always look at the big picture, a broad perspective of any issue in reacting to it. It is violence against the people of Kwara State and the economy of the state. My decision to speak out against this action that reflects the pettiness of the governor and his government, which is anti-people, and against the economic development of the state is irrespective of who is involved.

The State Governor, Abdulrahman Abdulrazaq is using this demolition exercise to intimidate, suppress, and silence all Kwarans. It is his reaction to the growing unpopularity of everything that he represents within the state. Why is Abdulrazaq just realising the fault or whatever he interprets to be wrong with the building of the Crystal Mall structure after 64 months that he has been in office?

The Kwara State Governor is ordering this demolition as his response in the aftermath of the recently conducted local government polls where people in all the constituencies massively voted and rose against his party and its candidates, even when he malevolently, fraudulently, and maliciously got contrary results to be declared by his hand-picked electoral officials. This is the beginning of a war against Kwara State for rejecting a governor who has failed to deliver good governance on all fronts. We should recall that he has ordered the arrest of some opposition politicians on frame-up charges.

In my view, Abdulrazaq believes unveiling a regime of violence and destruction against the people, particularly, the elite and their property will impose a culture of silence on the state. Now, the news circulating across Ilorin is that the next target of Abdulrazaq’s demolition squad is the place where the remains of my late father, Oloye (Dr.) Abubakar Olusola Saraki, of blessed memory, is interred. Even, this evil plan will not stop me from saying what is right. Let me make it clear that he will only try, he must be joking if he thinks he can erase the legacies left by the great Oloye.

What this Governor should know is that Kwara State does not belong to him. The state has existed long before he became governor and will continue to exist after he has ceased to be governor. After all, he has just about 31 months before he becomes a former governor. Abdulrazaq is the seventh democratically elected governor. None of those before him embarked on the demolition of properties to fight political opponents or score cheap political points. If I or the five other elected governors before him – late Alh. Adamu Attah, Chief C. O. Adebayo, Alh. Shaba Lafiagi, late Alh. Mohammed Lawal, and Dr. Abdulfatah Ahmed – had been demolishing the structures belonging to people for personal vendetta, nothing would have remained of Kwara State before he assumed office in 2019.

Abdulrazaq should know we will not allow him to destroy the peace, tranquility, and fear of God that Ilorin, in particular, and Kwara State in general, stand for. His eight years as governor cannot reshape the history of our Emirate and the State that has been in existence for over 50 years.

With this demolition of Crystal Mall, over one hundred youths who work there have lost their jobs and source of livelihood. Also, the 21 shop owners in that complex have lost their investment. What a loss to the state economy! At a time when people are facing hardship and there are no jobs, the focus of government should not be to destroy investment. The emphasis should be on how to grow the economy, help the private sector increase its investment in the state, generate employment, and make life better for ordinary people. These are key aspects of the basic functions of a government that has a purpose.

I urge all leaders of thought in Ilorin, members of the Ulammahs, elders, and other key stakeholders not to keep quiet. What the present government in Kwara State is doing is waging war against the people. It is bent on impoverishing the people. We should not be afraid to speak truth to power. This action of Abdulrazaq should not intimidate any of us. We should speak out because the motive is faulty and the aim is evil.

Let me also use this opportunity to call on all Kwarans to remain fearless, undaunted, and undeterred in standing against a government that has failed to fulfill its responsibilities to them. They should not allow this governor to destroy the peace that Kwara State is known for in the comity of Nigerian states.

Signed

Dr. Abubakar Bukola Saraki, CON
Former Senate President and Waziri of Ilorin

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a modern and general interest Magazine with its Headquarters in Abuja. The Magazine has a remarkable difference in editorial philosophy and goals, it adheres strictly to the ethics of Journalism by using the finest ethos of the profession to promote peace among citizens; identifying and harnessing the nation’s vast resources; celebrating achievements of government agencies, individuals, groups and corporate organizations and above all, repositioning Nigeria for the needed growth and development. Time Nigeria gives emphasis to places and issues that have not been given adequate attention by others. The Magazine is national in outlook and is currently being read and patronized both in print and on our vibrant and active online platform (www.timenigeria.com).
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The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

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  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
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