Opinion

Mr President, Think of the Common Man

3 Mins read

By Philemon Adjekuko

During the many riots that took place in the early sixties in Singapore, President Lee Kuan Yew realized that the destruction of properties were more sever in areas of the cities inhabited by tenants and squatters than they were in areas where people had their own homes. He, therefore, concluded that people generally put a lot of more value on own their own assets and would do so much to protect them than those of others. Enhancing the people’s ability to own valuable properties, he thought, could help to reduce tension and damage to society when citizens get angry and riotous for whatever reason. That became one of the factors that drove his hugely successful housing and urban renewal policies.

It turned out that in almost all policy decisions, President Lee was preoccupied and driven by the deep thought about how the average Singaporean would fare.

One more remarkable thing that the late President did was that he always challenged his men to come up with original solutions that would work for his people and not necessarily what was being practiced somewhere else in the world back then. In fact, he was legendary at spotting the deficiencies in foreign solutions while tackling Singapore’s myriad of problems. More often than not, the international press sneered at him only to hide their heads in shame much later when his policies proved more effective than the over hyped Western ones.

For instance, on the issue of pension, President Lee felt that each generation should carry its own burden unlike in the Western world where present and future generations bore the burden of providing for aging generations. He went on to design a safe pension investment scheme that ensured that workers did not invest in financial assets that could easily see their investment go up in smoke as it is often the case in the West.

Little wonder that late President Lee’s People’s Action Party (PAP) has remained in power for the past fifty six years. Remarkably, the PAP continues to be re-elected by Singaporean not because they had a grandiose plan to remain in power for decades by rigging, but the party cared for the Singaporean common man or what would be called the “Singaporean Persona”.

A Persona in business vocabulary is the typical customer for whom an entrepreneur designs a product. It is said that an entrepreneur’s product has a higher likelihood of success in the market place when he has segmented his market and zeroed in on his target persona. He must ask himself, where does this individual stay and work? What are his age, sex, education, marital status and life preferences? How much does he earn and spend? As the entrepreneurs answers these questions, he conceives a product that will both appeal and add value to the life of the “persona”. Such great businesses as APPLE, Boeing, Microsoft, Google, Yahoo. Ebay, Amazon are said to have used this business technique to make billions for their owners.

No doubt, late President Lee used this model to pole vault Singapore from the Third World into the first world long before it became a prized technique in the world of business.

The result of the last election was a referendum about whether or not the outgoing government and its party paid any attention to the average/common man or the Nigerian Persona. The election was an expression of the repress feeling of the common man which was harvested by an elite class that saw the opportunity. But given the anger on the street over myriads of issues which make life uncomfortable for many Nigerians, the referendum on the incoming administration and its party will begin on May 29th, 2015. With just a couple of false moves, the administration and its party will stall and a crash on the mountain tops in 2019.

Therefore, Mr President elect should keep the face of one Nigerian, the average Nigerian, in his bath room, bedroom and living room. That face, and not those of the “big men” who mill around him daily, should remind him why he is up there in the Villa. He should take time to watch the news and read newspapers to see how Nigerian is doing under his administration.

Mr. President elect clearly understands that the country is officially at war on the economic front. This is certainly not the time for eazzmatazz political maneuvers that do add value to the welfare of the people. Nigerians have had enough meaningless ”big grammar” and historinics. President elect needs to be drivenby a war room mentality. Thankfully, he knows all too what that means and his time starts now.

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a general interest Magazine with its headquarters in Abuja, the nation’s Capital.
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The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

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  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
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