Opinion

Local council autonomy, panacea to insecurity, says Akinwalere

3 Mins read

With disturbing level of insecurity in Nigeria, Ladi Adebutu Foundation recently organised a national discourse on using “Local Government System (Autonomy) as Panacea For National Security (Development)” held at the Olusegun Obasanjo Library, Abeokuta. Former National President, Nigeria Union of Local Government Employees (NULGE), Dr Adedeji Akinwalere, who was a lead discussant at the discourse told ROTIMI AGBOLUAJE spoke on why solutions lie in autonomous and functional local council system:

Why local councils in Nigeria are still ineffective
The country can achieve national development if local governments are structured to engender growth in terms of infrastructure. The first point we have to make here is that, the failure of local government system, which is largely engineered by state governments, is responsible for the crises and travails that we have in Nigeria. Our governors have made local governments unworkable, totally un-impactful and irrelevant to the extent people at grassroots have lost faith in governance at all levels.

Researches have shown that there is high correlation between all these crimes; kidnapping, ritual killings, armed robbery, banditry, Boko Haram and whatever crises you can think of, and the failure of the system at local government level. In the past, local government would offer employment, do project, award contracts. But in recent times, all we hear about local government is how state governors hijacked their allocation.

We must not forget that the entire concept of policing started from local level. In the First Republic or even before then, from 1951 up to 1965, we had the Native Authority Police both in the Northern region and West and they were very functional. They knew criminals; they knew where the flashpoints were. But what we have today is a kind of policing at the grassroots; a force to enforce the law of a government that is so far away from people, to compel and force them to submission.

There should be a return to the original local government policing system where people at local level are engaged. From what we have seen in the North East, Nigeria Police cannot solve these problems. Nigerian Army, including operatives of the Department of Security Service (DSS) cannot solve the problem. In fact, their combinations have not been able to solve the problem.  Now, they are integrating what they call civilian Joint Task Force (JTF) that is local: people who know the terrain and hideouts of these people, including the topography of the place.

Views on agitations for state Police
To have state police is in order, however, we must admit that we once had a Native Authority Police that worked. A lot of them have come out with some unacceptable and illogical argument in the past that Native Authority Police was corrupt but nobody could say they were not effective.  In the North, it was well organised and functioned very well up to 1978.  So, the solution to some of these local crimes lies not with just state police, it lies with community policing but not the type Inspector General of Police is doing.  But a Native Authority Police that can be well organised, that can solve some of the problems.

Role of traditional leaders in crime management 
The problem with Nigeria is that our leaders, whether at the Federal or State levels don’t read. They don’t know history or they just ignore History probably because they are afraid of it and that is why they are taking History out of our curriculum. The truth is that even before colonial period, we had our own native security system. Monarchs had their own army, the Benin kingdom had its army, Oyo Empire had its own, Ijebu kingdom had theirs. In fact, Ijebu kingdom in Magbonwon in 1895 faced colonial government in a war, although they were overpowered.

Apart from the army established by the various kingdoms, there was a policing system within each palace, which is still the case in all palaces today. We must find a way to integrate traditional rulers into governance.

On autonomy for local councils
We must commend President Muhammadu Buhari for that bold decision, but you will realise that nearly all the governors rose up against the order of the President we have. What we have is a system that has muzzled the functionaries at local government level. Even when they pay the money to the councils’ accounts, they still have to take the allocation to the states for re-disbursement just to fulfill all righteousness.

We don’t need a new law or sanctions, there are more than enough laws which EFCC and ICPC can effectively deal with cases of fraud that emanated from transactions, it is just for them to up their games and align themselves with what Mr. President said. There is a huge fraud still going on under the operation, and the disregard for Mr. President’s order. That the President has given order is not enough, he must mobilise the anti-fraud agencies to follow up on the directive.

On need for regular auditing of Council’s accounts
Yes, I think to some extent, at the state level, we have the Accountant General for local government that could do that, but the person who is there is appointed at the whims and caprices of the state governor who is the chief architect of the misappropriation and misapplication of council funds, so where is the accountability?

The Federal Government itself does not have sufficient integrity to leave Abuja and go to Bauchi, Imo or Ogun State to inspect audited accounts.

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a general interest Magazine with its headquarters in Abuja, the nation’s Capital.
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The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

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  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
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The President of Globe Legislators International, Rt. Hon. Sir Sam Onuigbo, has called on members and stakeholders of the All Progressives Congress…
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