Economy

Of e-naira and emerging digital currency imperialism

5 Mins read

Last week’s historic adoption of ‘bitcoin’ by El Salvador as a legal tender presents a new analytical trend on the entire concept of money.

The mistrust that clouded the courageous roll-out as well as the widespread dip of the cryptocurrency market points to the increasing role of external variables in determining the value of money.

The $30-in-bitcoin ‘bribe’ extended to every Salvadorian is also metaphoric of the emerging concept of money as a store of value, not only for the South American country but for other future adopters of the digital currency and businesses that are already accepting cryptocurrency payment. Few hours into the roll-out, the $30-incentives had shrunk to $25 as the coin dived from $52, 000 to $43, 000 in an hour amidst the hysteria and glitch around the functionality of the digital wallet.

In the run-up to the adoption, the El-Salvadorian government’s mop-up of the market to stock for its not-too-eager citizens among other factors had pumped the value of the flagship cryptocurrency to a three-month high. The historic adoption should, by logic, drive the consolidation of the uptrend of the past few weeks. Unfortunately, there is no science or logic in the crypto world. Hence the sudden dip – the steepest fall in recent history – could only shock a Salvadoran who was holding the electronic currency for the first time.

There have been different theories on the crash that followed the bumpy start to the ‘nationalisation’ of the extremely volatile cryptocurrencies. First, the sell-the-news theory, a model built on the pumping of financial asset value on the premise of a future event that could remarkably push up the price, only for those who warehouse the asset to dump it when the expected event eventually happens.

Another prominent explanation is connected to the increasing role of whales in the novel investment market. Whales are individuals or institutions which hold large amounts of a certain cryptocurrency. Like market makers in the conventional financial market, whales leverage their disproportionately huge asset sizes in trade to alter the direction of the market in a manipulative manner.

They are responsible for the pumping and dumping culture, which has become a norm in the cryptocurrency space. There is, thus, an argument that the whales dumped their hoardings to take profits when bitcoin hit $52,000 or called up their arsenal to trigger a crash in commemoration of El Salvador’s bitcoin adoption just to prove a point.

Here, whichever supposition may be true is not as important as the possibility of an individual or non-state actors to cause a major upset in the value of a supposed legal tender. It means that certain variables that were hitherto considered as residual may not matter anymore in modeling the value of money in economies like El-Salvador.

The decentralised character of cryptocurrency and the coefficient manipulative possibility are at the heart of the argument for the central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and virtual formats of fiat currencies issued by central banks. Today, about 80 per cent of central banks, including that of Nigeria, are in the process of issuing CBDCs. Its necessity, notwithstanding, the CBDC invention raises some salient questions on currency imperialism.

Recently, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) engaged the central banks of Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa and Australia to test the use of CBDCs for international settlements.

Dubbed Project Dunbar, the initiative will develop prototype shared platforms for cross-border transactions using multiple CBDCs, eliminating the need for intermediaries and reducing the time and cost of transactions. The project intends to develop technical prototypes on different distributed ledger technology platforms.

Of the projects whose technical prototypes will be demonstrated at the Singapore FinTech Festival holding in November, Chief Fintech Officer at Monetary Authority of Singapore, Sopnendu Mohanty, said: “Project Dunbar’s work on using multi-CBDC platforms to facilitate seamless multi-currency fund transfers is a significant contribution to the global vision to make payments cheaper and faster. The findings on how a common platform can be governed effectively and managed efficiently will shape the blueprint of the next generation payment systems.”

A similar BIS-led project, exploring CBDCs for cross-border payments, also involves central banks of China, Hong Kong, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Details of these concepts are still sketchy but they align with the thinking of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in using stable coins to drive down the cost of remittances and cross-border financial transactions. The Managing Director of IMF, Kristalina Georgieva, at a forum on digital currency, said the adoption of stable coins is crucial to reducing remittances in developing countries and preventing the “digital divide”.

At the national level, countries are jostling for the smartest and most scalable electronic money that can compete beyond their physical borders. China had worked on digital yuan for years but the project only got into overdrive when Facebook revealed its plan for Diem, its electronic currency. China has found a limitless opportunity in its CBDC to reinforce its efforts to challenge the supremacy of the dollar. It also intends to pitch the digital yuan as a global currency. And fortunately, CBDCs, like other e-money forms, are only limited by their scale of utilities and not physical national borders.

Other powers, including Russia, have joined the race for CBDC, a dream not only driven by the need to duplicate existing fiats electronically but also as weapons of extra-national economic subjugation. Developing countries, including Nigeria, are also on the verge of issuing electronic money but may necessarily not in the context of economic subjugation.

Yet, the Director-General of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Lamido Yuguda, has argued that e-naira must be designed to operate beyond Nigeria to explore the opportunity in the cross-border transaction opportunity.

Yuguda who spoke at the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria (CIBN) Advocacy Dialogue Series Four, said “the design and functionality” of the proposed e-naira must take into cognizance of the aspirations of other countries.

“In three to four years, some models will be more successful than the others. We need to be alert to what other countries are doing. I know that some countries will want to position their currencies in such a way that they will attract other users beyond their borders,” he advised.

About two weeks ago, the apex bank announced the engagement of a Barbados-based digital financial technology firm, Bitt Inc, as a technical partner for the e-naira project, which will be unveiled before the end of the year.

With operations spreading across the Caribbean, Bitt utilises blockchain and distributed ledger technology to facilitate peer-to-peer (P2P) transactions with mobile money across a suite of Bitt’s Software and mobile applications.

A statement by the Bank said the firm was chosen through a highly competitive bidding process. It said it was chosen on its technological competence, efficiency, platform security, interoperability and implementation experience.

“In choosing Bitt Inc, the CBN relied on the company’s tested and proven digital currency experience, which is already in circulation in several Eastern Caribbean Countries. Bitt Inc. was key to the development and successful launch of the central bank digital currency (CBDC) pilot of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) in April 2021,” the statement said.

But the issue is less about the competence of the technical partner than the limited time left to work on the project. Of course, the e-naira idea was first mooted in 2017 but it only got accelerated attention earlier in the year after the apex bank stopped financial institutions from transacting in cryptocurrency trading.

Programme Lead, Sustainable and Inclusive Digital Financial Services Initiative, Prof. Olayinka David-West, at the CIBN forum, spoke extensively on the technical tasks involved in achieving a secured, scalable and hitch-free CBDC.

Does the CBN have sufficient time to build the most needed infrastructure for an e-naira Nigerians would trust, unlike the El-Salvadoran bitcoin experiment that has triggered protests? Time will tell.

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a general interest Magazine with its headquarters in Abuja, the nation’s Capital.
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The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

6 Mins read
  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
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