AnalysisEconomyPerspective

Big Economic Crisis Looms in Nigeria

4 Mins read

Naira is losing value in the eyes of Nigerians, and that’s why it will continue to deteriorate. Some hotels, landlords, and schools in Nigeria charge in dollars instead of Naira.

Ahmed Adamu, PhD

As Nigeria heads to a decisive election in 2023, attentions are largely on the candidates and political parties and intrigues in between. Little do Nigerians know about the impending danger their economy faces.

The Nigerian currency faces the worst devaluation ever as Nigerians shun away from their local currencies. There are now competing dollar queues in Nigerian banking halls. Nigerians are rushing to open dollar accounts and converting their savings into dollars.

People prefer to store their money in dollars than in Naira, as keeping the dollar alone is now a lucrative investment due to the continuous Naira devaluation. The increasing demand for the dollar increases the supply of the Naira and hence its continuous devaluation.

Most of the demand for the dollar is not for transaction purposes but speculative reasons. Hoarding the dollar and waiting for it to increase value to sell it is disastrous and treasonous economically.

Dollar hoarding and speculation increase the supply of Naira in circulation and fuel even more inflation. Already the headline inflation is as high as 16% as of the first quarter of 2022. More Naira in circulation will increase inflation to above 20%. As the 2023 election season has started, election and campaign spending by politicians will fuel even more inflation.

Naira is losing value in the eyes of Nigerians, and that’s why it will continue to deteriorate. Some hotels, landlords, and schools in Nigeria charge in dollars instead of Naira.

Trading local goods and services in dollars is the surefire way to total economic collapse. Even government transactions and spendings are also in dollars. These created huge dollar demand and scarcity and shot its value high, which as of April 2022, stands at N590 in the parallel market.

Foreign investors are now finding it difficult to repatriate their revenue from Nigeria in foreign currencies. Some international airlines have complained about their inability to repatriate their revenues in dollars, which forced them to now sell their tickets only in dollars. This development will further increase the demand for the dollar and the oversupply of the Naira and further devalue the Naira.

The continuous devaluation of the Naira is putting enormous pressure on Nigeria’s foreign reserve, which was questionably reported to be around $40 billion as of February 2022. The parity fixed exchange rate policy is widening the depletion of the foreign reserve.

Sometimes, authorities might not be open about the reserve depletion to protect the integrity of the economy. However, if the effect explodes, it will be catastrophic.

The increasing cost of pegging the dollar will soon become unbearable. However, liberalizing the exchange rate market will increase the dollar value to about N1,000 or more. This will cause hyperinflation, increasing unemployment, and capital flight. It is the trap Nigeria found itself in.

Investors are already avoiding Nigeria due to the fluctuating and unreliable forex policies. Existing investors are already thinking of divesting. Foreign Direct Investment inflows are at their lowest in a decade. The main source of forex in Nigeria is crude oil sales, and that is also reducing due to the crude oil swap system.

Investment analysts highlighted severe social, market, and political risks of investing in Nigeria. These range from insecurity, insufficient infrastructure, and government interventions to political unrest and instabilities.

These risks caused an almost a collapse in the non-oil exports in the country, leaving the economy very susceptible to oil market volatilities. It also makes imports susceptible to exchange rate fluctuations and foreign inflation.

The local manufacturers struggle to acquire expensive dollars to import capital and inputs. These are conditions for hyperinflation, a serious economic crisis that could destroy the Naira. Once the Naira collapses, so does Nigeria’s economy.

With the increasing capital flights, imports, borrowing, and budget deficit, one can only wait for the inevitable explosion.

Very soon Nigeria’s government may become unable to peg the value of the dollar, and once this happens, then the worst catastrophe will befall the Naira. The collapse of the Naira will demolish the purchasing power of people’s income and usher in more hunger and poverty. Once these happen, the total anarchy will set in.

However, the above impending agony can be prevented by taking certain decisive actions. First, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) must be checkmated to fish out excesses and effectively manage the forex policy through transparency and fairness.

The CBN must meet the demand of the foreign investors and airlines to enable them easily repatriate their income in foreign currency. This will boost investor confidence by having the guarantee of liquidity of their returns in their desired currency.

The unnecessary discharge and sale of dollars must be stopped. There should be new reforms to discourage trading physical dollars in the country. The government should set a maximum target for using dollars for official activities and transactions.

The government should minimize the need for dollars in its transactions. We have to add value to our locally manufactured products and services to increase the supply of forex through exports. Citizens must be conscientise of the importance of valuing the local currency and the danger of saving or transacting locally in dollars.

For us to manage our economy, we have to manage inflation and restore confidence in Naira, and this can only happen through economic reforms such as import substitutions, forex reforms, and investment in infrastructure.

We have to develop our major mineral resources and build the agricultural value chain for exports and attract forex. Foreign investors can only come if we can strategically address the social, economic, and political risks in the country.

The next administration has a herculean task to rescue the sinking economy first before rebuilding it. That is why the focus should be on which candidates understand the economy and the solutions. Otherwise, we will all be doomed and fall into serious economic crises like what happened in Asia in 1997, Zimbabwe in 2008, and recently in Sri Lanka.

The 2023 election is not just a common election between parties, it is a decision on the fate of our economy and by extension our survival. Therefore, it is not about a region, party, or ethnicity, it is about the vision that could overturn the current mayhem.

Ahmed Adamu, PhD
Petroleum Economist
ahmadadamu1@gmail.com
@AhmedAdamu

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a modern and general interest Magazine with its Headquarters in Abuja. The Magazine has a remarkable difference in editorial philosophy and goals, it adheres strictly to the ethics of Journalism by using the finest ethos of the profession to promote peace among citizens; identifying and harnessing the nation’s vast resources; celebrating achievements of government agencies, individuals, groups and corporate organizations and above all, repositioning Nigeria for the needed growth and development. Time Nigeria gives emphasis to places and issues that have not been given adequate attention by others. The Magazine is national in outlook and is currently being read and patronized both in print and on our vibrant and active online platform (www.timenigeria.com).
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The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

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  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
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