Opinion

A capable successor ’ll be Buhari’s greatest legacy

4 Mins read

Speaking in one of his many public lectures at the Harvard Business School, the late great management guru, Dr. Peter Drucker, once said, “There is no success without a successor,” emphasising that succession planning and transition is one of the major responsibilities of transcendent leaders. In other words, sustaining the achievement of a leader can only be guaranteed if such leader makes a conscious effort to raise worthy and capable successor who will consolidate on his or her legacies. Leaders who prepare and mentor their successors safeguard the future of their organizations and country, and helps it avoid the turbulence associated with succession.

Although Dr. Drucker was addressing the global corporate community, his message applies even more to leaders of nations and how they manage their succession planning and transition especially in such nations that have embraced democratic principles that support four-year electoral cycles. It becomes even more of a challenge to leaders in emerging democracies where personal interests of political actors struggle to undermine national interest. Generally, nations are going concerns, which means they have a continued existence and therefore should be treated as if they will continue to operate indefinitely. Far sighted successful leaders understand that they will eventually leave their current jobs but are mindful of how and in who they hand over to. For leaders of nations, the power of state gives them the uncommon ability not only to choose their successors, but to also support them through the electoral process. 

It is imperative to note that in choosing a successor, the best option is to choose someone who is prepared, equipped and ready for the job. However, the fundamental mistake most organizations and nations make in succession planning is trying to clone its leaders or trying to copy the existing leader. This does not only stifle innovation and creativity but creates a culture that has no space for innovation. Such cloned successors are blocked from thinking out of the box, which undermines socio-economic progress. On the contrary, leadership—succession is like a relay race and successful leaders understand that the process of passing the baton can be complicated, irrespective of the skill and experiences of the runners. 

The process of passing the baton is a crucial success factor in the result of a relay race and it can be tricky and risky. What this means is that runners need to practice baton passing over and over again and learn about the best practice and approach in order to avoid potential errors. Again, since every second counts, runners are taught the best techniques when it comes to hand coordination. They do not just switch hands when carrying the baton, if the first runner holds the baton in the right hand, the second runner will receive the baton and will run with it in the left hand, the third will receive and carry the baton in the right hand and the final runner will handle it in the left hand. It is instructive to note that all these preparations are done before the day of competition, so that the runner runs well from the start.

The above narrative, perhaps, helps us understand the relationship between President Muhammadu Buhari and his deputy, Prof. Oluyemi Oluleke Osinbajo, SAN. While Mr President has been quiet on this subject matter for obvious reasons, a careful observer will note that it seems that President Buhari has been subtly preparing his Vice as part of his succession plan. The Vice President has even given a clue which helps explain this point.  Speaking during his presidential declaration speech on the 11th of April, the VP stated “In the past seven years, I have served as Vice President under a true Nigerian patriot, a servant of the nation in war and peace, and a man of integrity, President Muhammadu Buhari. We have, together, worked through some of the most difficult times in the history of our Nation, but we have remained focused on securing the country, providing infrastructure, and growing our economy.” 

This statement is not only a pointer to the fact that Mr President has been consciously raising him as part of his succession plan, it also brought to the fore, one of his most distinguishing credentials, which gives him a clear edge amongst the list of other presidential aspirants who have shown interest, especially those under the leading party, the All Progressives Congress (APC). Osinbajo’s experience as the Vice President under Buhari’s administration gives him a leading edge, especially as it relates to consolidating on the gains of Buhari’s administration. When one further considers his unwavering sense of loyalty to Mr. President, his rigorous erudition and professionalism, his stern discipline and proven integrity in the discharge of his constitutionally assigned duties, one would better understand why he fits rightly into Buhari’s succession plan.

Considering the unfolding dramatic political events in recent times, — from the number of persons who have declared their interests to run for the office of the President, to the characters of those aspirants, — one would better appreciate why President Buhari has kept his succession strategy close to his chest. It becomes even more worrisome when reliable sources confirm that most of these aspirants within the APC are sponsored by one aspirant who is a money-bag with the intention of getting them to stepdown for him, creating a false landslide effect during the primaries. As we watch these dramas unfold, one thing that is clear, especially to social scientists, is that they reflect the state of our social evolution as a nation. It therefore behoves on President Buhari to rise above the temptation, maintain his known principles of discipline and patriotism and give Nigeria a good man who would consolidate on the gains of his administration and open up new frontiers for our national development. That would be his greatest Legacy. 

In the final analysis, the ultimate measure of his presidency would be the character of the man he chooses to support as the next president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In my view, providence has already made it easy for him, because he has an able deputy, Prof. Yemi Osinbajo, SAN, a good man who represents the best amongst us and who is equally well prepared for the job.
Obele, a sociologist, wrote from Abuja.

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a general interest Magazine with its headquarters in Abuja, the nation’s Capital.
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The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

6 Mins read
  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
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