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Democracy, Deep Pockets and Their Ramifications

5 Mins read

By abiodun KOMOLAFE

Being a former British Colony, Nigeria had the political misfortune of being bequeathed with a public administration system that was based on _‘Migrated Social Structure’;_ and it could not have been otherwise. After all, it’s the only systemic public administration structure known to the British. Consequently, and right from the outset, the tools of public engagement at all levels, in particular, struggled with the norms and values of Nigerians. Absent the domestication of the intrinsic norms, ethics and usage of the colonial administrative system over a period of time, the emergent system acquired a life of its own; deformed, or, at best, a compromised caricature. And, despite intermittent and laborious attempts at reforming its bureaucracy, this compromised system and its attendant systemic anomalies have only continued to advance exponentially at the expense of the professed developmental agenda of Nigeria’s founding fathers.

Put differently, although the gamut of the extant government machinery is said to exist to serve the public, in reality, it provides services for the privileged class and the well-connected members of the society through the determined pace, mercy and direction of the public and civil servants. Against this background, democracy as a form of government will still have to be interpreted and powered by the State’s bureaucracy as it deems fit. Beyond the definition of the concept of democracy, its interpretive understanding and the political orientation of the power elite, political gladiators and the power-brokers are the motivational factors driving government performance.

As things stand in Nigeria, our democracy cannot but reveal certain and peculiar tendencies. For instance, though we identify our bureaucratic structure as a democracy, it doesn’t have to conform to what obtains elsewhere. Here in Nigeria, democracy is huge business; and only the rich and the well-connected run for elections into her critical public offices. Extant laws against excessive funding and spending notwithstanding, stupendous amount of money is always expended by our politicians and public office seekers on this four-year routinized exercise. Political participation is made attractive and possible through money, and only the moneybags are the authentic players. This is reinforced by the whet and insatiable appetite of political jobbers and party officials who are always out for pecuniary rewards. The masses respond to money and not manifestos, ideas, or political ideology. Yet, we call the system, ‘democratic’ even when a system which selectively disenfranchises participants cannot be said to be truly democratic. The major snag is that the so-called democratic institutions that are supposed to correct these anomalies are also part of the problems. So, who is fooling who?

Talking about deep pockets, there is no doubt that they possess the power to create their own pattern; and that pattern is called _‘entitlement syndrome’._ For example, those delegates who became _‘accidental millionaires’_ just because they served as delegates at the last party conventions in Nigeria might have learnt some lessons about politics to the extent that if there’s going to be another round of presidential party conventions in the next four years, the operational code will have been horned, since some participant-delegates already knew how lucrative it was to be a delegate. So, chances are that selection of delegates in 2027 will be a battle to the finish. Then again, the piper payers who have surreptitiously established – and are oiling – the syndrome will jerk up the rate at the next available opportunity. It is normal with human beings!

Be that as it may, the beneficiaries of the largesse are not likely to see it as if somebody has done, or is doing them a favour, but more of what they are entitled to. So, this creates a pattern which makes it difficult to have good governance, because the money that is expected to be used to promote it is already frittered away on other issues. Of course, once this is created, it has the means of creating a pattern; and, once that pattern is created. The society will only be shouting! It is what has led to vote-buying! So, when the electorate start accusing the government of negligence or incapacity, the reasons, in part, are as adduced above.

In development, one of the first things to look at is pattern formation. Had Nigeria been a serious country, the pattern of development she’s had was enough for development. Should anyone want to draw a chart, or compare stuffs about dear fatherland, all one has to do was to interrogate the pattern with a view to drawing informed conclusions. For example, successive military coups have come with a promise to curb the excesses as well as right the wrongs of the politicians. Looking back, how many of those wrongs have been righted? How many among their promises have been thwarted and how many of those excesses have remained with us till date? As if the gods are angry, successive leaders have merely succeeded in scratching the wrongs on the surface; nobody has uprooted anything. And that’s why we are where we are!

Events, as they unfold with each passing day have shown that, in a compromised democracy, corruption is a necessity. Once the system is no longer working the way it should, corruption becomes the driving force. It becomes the oxygen. The likelihood of even the rights activists succumbing due to intense heat from the fire abject poverty is very high. So, to think that those who have spent their life savings will not, on getting into political office, strive at recouping their expenses is to embrace the philosophy of the idiots. How can they truly afford to develop the society? Besides, it is not in their objective interest to develop the society, because, if they do, corruption will start waning; and when it does, their business can’t thrive again! After all, sustaining an amorphous system demands oiling the machine; and oiling the machine means accommodating more corruption. When a system works as it should, fraudsters won’t get work to do. But interestingly, the fraudsters have taken over. So, corruption has taken a sunken taproot. And, in order to sustain that corruption, one needs more money. Since those who are corrupt are also conscious that there will one day be a stop to it, they can’t but be aggressively in a hurry to make all the money before _‘kasala’_ eventually bursts.

Think about policy options that have turned the Nigerian state into a series of sociopolitical accidents and one will find out that the kind of leadership a country gets will determine how far it can go! It is also sad that leadership in this part of the world has become more like a cult; a game for every Dick, Tom and Harry. Ours is now politics of cliques and nuclear families. I doubt if any of us can be qualified to be amongst the extended relatives. To borrow the late Obafemi Awolowo’s words, what we have is _‘ojelu’,_ no longer _‘oselu.’_ We are where we are because our system allows the emergence of certain and preferred leadership to manage the affairs of the country. Again, that the Nigerian society has ebbed to the point of a home-grown anomie is no longer news. Hence the only way to arrest it is to truthfully arrest it; and by that, we mean a total overhaul, which starts even from the family.

May the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world, grant us peace in Nigeria!

_*Komolafe wrote in from Ijebu-Jesa, Osun State (ijebujesa@yahoo.co.uk; 07087941459 – SMS only)_

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a modern and general interest Magazine with its Headquarters in Abuja. The Magazine has a remarkable difference in editorial philosophy and goals, it adheres strictly to the ethics of Journalism by using the finest ethos of the profession to promote peace among citizens; identifying and harnessing the nation’s vast resources; celebrating achievements of government agencies, individuals, groups and corporate organizations and above all, repositioning Nigeria for the needed growth and development. Time Nigeria gives emphasis to places and issues that have not been given adequate attention by others. The Magazine is national in outlook and is currently being read and patronized both in print and on our vibrant and active online platform (www.timenigeria.com).
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The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

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  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. 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