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Economy: Why President Tinubu Should Be Worried

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I think that rather than sit down and pin the situation down to the usual “need to diversify the economy,” or the “we have secured $20 billion in investments” claim, the administration needs to take practical steps to deal with Nigerians as fellow citizens, rather than laboratory tools being used for scientific experiments in the hands of IMF/World Bank.

By Taiwo Adisa

Last week, the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) reeled out some statistics that painted a very gloomy economic scenario of the nation since President Bola Tinubu took over. The most scary aspect of that picture was the claim that more than 300 companies have shut down, while some 380,000 jobs have been lost in the last two months.

Senator Ahmed Abdukadir, who spoke in Abuja during an investigative hearing by the National Assembly, said that the hike in electricity tariff has been chiefly responsible, as he lamented that one of the companies that employed 360,000 workers has been forced to drastically cut the workforce to 5,000. Power alone is responsible for at least 40 per cent of companies’ overheads, he said.

Also, on the dot of the Tinubu administration’s first anniversary, the International Centre for Investigative Reporting (ICRC) undertook a series of x-raying service delivery under the administration. In one of the series, it listed companies that have divested from Nigeria in the last one year, mentioning multinationals in different sectors of the economy. Some of the names include Procter and Gamble, Kimberlerly-Clark; Microsoft; Sanofi; Equinor GlaxoSmithKline; Bolt food, and Jumia Food among others. The decision of Guinness to divest from Nigeria last week was another bad hit for the economy.

Though, some might want to explain away the enormity of the disaster to a rise in local capacity, the fact that the country is losing big partners who have operated in our economy for decades should tell anyone that similar companies would think twice before venturing into the Nigerian market.

Whether there is a rise in local capacity or not, the loss of a long-standing multinational partner should send cold shivers down the spines of planners of an economy such as ours. Particularly because it is one economy whose operators are forever in search of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). If the oil majors are divesting from your economy, the big service providers are doing the same as well as the global manufacturers, how are you going to convince anyone out there that your economy is receptive to foreign investment?

Incidentally, two main policies of the Tinubu government have been adduced as the immediate trigger of the exit by these companies. One is the exchange rate policy, and the second is the rise in electricity tariff.

Not a few have expressed surprise that the ship of the nation’s economy is hitting the rock right under the nose of the Lagos men. The haemorrhage is perhaps unprecedented, except compared to the situation of the country under the pariah status when General Sani Abacha ran his dictatorship. Lagos is the economic capital of the country, even as Abuja remains its political capital. on the streets, they say Eko o Gba gbere. An alternative lingo would be Warri no dey carry last. Lagos is known for its fast pace. The whole of Nigeria has always prided Lagos as suave in business, and the least they expect is that the Lagos character would permeate the system when the nation comes under the leadership of Lagos “boys.”

It all points to one thing. Nigerian leaders must remain circumspect while imbibing advice from Western economic managers. One of the key items of debate among economists in the wee days of President Muhammadu Buhari was the push by the IMF and the World Bank that Nigeria should float its currency. An euphemism for the devaluation of the Naira. The man in charge of the Central Bank of Nigeria at the time resisted the bid and was able to hand over the nation’s currency at an official rate of N460 to the US dollar. On assumption of office, President Tinubu acceded to the push by the Bretton Woods institutions by first removing subsidy on fuel, the main driver of the economy, floated the naira and then further removed subsidy on energy. The combined effect of the policies is the downward spiral fall of the nation’s currency and the strangulation of the individuals’ purchasing power due to the skyrocketing inflation.

The prices of products can no longer be guaranteed even within the same day. Big businesses that had completed their AGMs and notified their head offices of a particular amount they made as profits saw such profits wiped out within hours due to the gallivanting exchange rates.

No serious business can survive such undulating measures, and global businesses are used to much more serenity than what Nigeria is offering.

The combined effect of the IMF/World Bank-induced policies has not only pauperised Nigerians it is killing them softly. Take, for instance, the pharmaceutical sector. The multinationals that left us are only deepening the holes of economic and financial misery. First, we don’t have alternatives to the medications they produce, meaning that we have to import their products from wherever their headquarters are located. Secondly, we have thrown a number of our citizens who work in those companies into the already saturated unemployment market. Talk of double jeopardy. Drugs that used to sell for N5,000 are not going for between N25,000 and N30,000. Those that used to cost close to N20,000 before May last year are now in the region of N100,000 or more.

Above all, it is Lagos that loses. Most of the multinationals are either located in Lagos or Ogun State. The warehouses are fast turning into religious houses. More are turning to homes for the destitute. One company was said to have invested over $300 million to set up its factory in Agbara less than three years ago, and it had to announce its exit, leaving hundreds of factory hands and executives in limbo. As Lagos and Ogun States’ economy gets hit, Nigerians are suffocating unbearably.

I think that rather than sit down and pin the situation down to the usual “need to diversify the economy,” or the “we have secured $20 billion in investments” claim, the administration needs to take practical steps to deal with Nigerians as fellow citizens, rather than laboratory tools being used for scientific experiments in the hands of IMF/World Bank.

One thing I’ve seen is that these institutions will never come back to say sorry no matter how fatally flawed their experiments turned out to be.

In the days of General Ibrahim Babangida, the government was hoodwinked into believing that there was no alternative to the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Any discussion aimed at finding alternatives or even discussing the possibility was disrupted and proponents were arrested. At the end of the long years of experimentation, there was no positive result from the laboratory. Still, Nigerians have died in their numbers owing to the negative effects of the SAP. I read somewhere last week that the World Bank was quoted as telling the CBN that rate hikes alone can’t tame inflation. However, the same policy was said to have been adopted on the advice of the global banker.

Rather than adopting the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions hook line and sinker, third-world countries would do themselves a huge favour by first juxtaposing the social-economic realities in their polity before swallowing poisonous doses.

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a modern and general interest Magazine with its Headquarters in Abuja. The Magazine has a remarkable difference in editorial philosophy and goals, it adheres strictly to the ethics of Journalism by using the finest ethos of the profession to promote peace among citizens; identifying and harnessing the nation’s vast resources; celebrating achievements of government agencies, individuals, groups and corporate organizations and above all, repositioning Nigeria for the needed growth and development. Time Nigeria gives emphasis to places and issues that have not been given adequate attention by others. The Magazine is national in outlook and is currently being read and patronized both in print and on our vibrant and active online platform (www.timenigeria.com).
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The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

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  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
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