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The Kabiyesi Mentality as Bane of Democratic Growth in Nigeria

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Even as President Obasanjo talked of democracy with links to African roots, he is equally aware that the Kabiyesi syndrome of the precolonial era did not stop the Oyo Empire from putting in place checks and balances for the Alaafin, the Kabiyesi (one who cannot be questioned), to the extent that the King (Alaafin) can be compelled to commit suicide. We have to agree that the Kabiyesi mentality adorned by today’s democratic rulers is a higher grade than what operated before colonialism and that remains the root of the nation’s underdevelopment.

By Taiwo Adisa

Former President Olusegun Obasanjo has been at it in recent conversations. Western democracy is not working for Africa, so, we need a homegrown democratic model that will work for us. He suggested what he called “afro-democracy.”

The former president is really suited to lead that discussion, whether for Nigeria or in the African context. He came into governance through the fortunes of succeeding a military boss, who was gunned down in an aborted coup he did not plan. He completed the transition programme enunciated by his late boss and handed over power to a civilian administration. Then he became an ombudsman for the political system and an African statesman-almost an authority in governance, and succession politics.

In December 1997, the military government of the late General Sani Abacha felt he was becoming too loud a public commentator and roped him into the phantom coup, allegedly planned by the late Lt. Gen Oladipo Diya and others. He (Obasanjo) was imprisoned. As Abacha’s regime was plotting to execute its final judgement on him, luck smiled at the Owu General, and fate brought him out of the Gulag. He became another example of a leader who came from prison to power. He spent the two constitutionally allowed four-year terms and left power for another civilian successor. Since then, he has regained his position as the ombudsman of African democracy.

In May, when he met with some members of the House of Representatives who are canvassing Nigeria’s return to the parliamentary system, Obasanjo advocated the adoption of “afro-democracy,” which he said should be connected to our culture, history, and way of life.

He said: “Let me go back to the beginning where we got it wrong—the Western liberal democracy, that is what the Europeans have. When you look at Western liberal democracy, it is a product of their history, a product of their culture, a product of their way of life.

“I have looked into most African languages. Western democracy has what they call loyal opposition. What is opposition in African languages? Enemy. Western democracies called oppositions “loyal” because the oppositions are loyal to the monarchy. That’s where their loyal democracy began. They used to have monarchies.

“There is nothing in the liberal democracy that is African. We ruled ourselves before the advent of colonialism. We had empires and striving kingdoms. We did not rule ourselves as opposition

“What is in it for us? I don’t know but you can give it. For lack of an appropriate word, let us call it ‘afro-democracy.’ That is where we have to begin.” As much as I agree with President Obasanjo that Western democracy is not delivering the goods here in Nigeria and parts of Africa, I would submit that we cannot continue to blame the Western proponents of democracy for that remissness, decades after they left us to rule ourselves.

We cannot continue to blame the West for introducing a ‘strange’ system of governance to us because democracy itself comes with an in-built disclaimer: there is no standard democracy anywhere. In other words, my democracy is not your democracy. The democracy of the English is different from that of the Americans, Canadians, French, Spanish, Germans, Italians, and even Russia. From the East to Central and Western Europe to the Americas, every territory tailored its democracy alongside its culture, history, and tradition.

But is the African or Nigerian problem ingrained in the name we call the system of government or in our stars? That should be the question. Yes, the parliamentary system can help reduce the cost of elections, but what stops a quick finger from pilling away the saved resources to unknown islands, where the long arms of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and other eagle-eyed financial watchdogs cannot reach.

What’s in a name? Williams Shakespeare asked through Juliet in the popular play with an eponymous title, Romeo and Juliet. “That which we call a rose/By any other name would smell as sweet,” she concluded. Though Bible scholars and many African communities would conclude that a name carries the essence of a person’s character and that when God created Adam, he asked him to name all things put under his care as a sign of authority and familiarity, I do not think that Africa’s developmental woes are irremediably linked to the adoption of democratic values of the West.

Beyond the sloganeering around presidential or parliamentary systems, I believe that a pertinent starting point is to ask some basic questions: What do we make of the system of government bestowed on us by the Western colonialists? What vision do we project for our country and our people? How do we value ourselves in the comity of nations? And how deep-seated is our focus on the development of our country and continent? Unless we can provide valid and objective answers to those questions, we may not get anything out of whatever system of government, call it afro-democracy, monarchy, diarchy or what have you.

Take the example of Nigeria. How would a country, whose system produces 36 state governors, 469 national lawmakers, the president, his deputy, and a coterie of officers in the executive and judicial arms of government, many of whom are struggling to outdo one another in stashing their treasures as well as legal and illegal financial gains in western and faraway lands get out of the woods? And every four years, the masses are called upon to endorse or replace some of these officials, with others who would only want to outdo the profligacy and looting skills of their predecessors.

The misery such a scenario would wrought on the polity/people cannot be blamed on the name ascribed to the governance system-parliamentary, presidential, or monarchy. After all, the parliamentary system was adopted when the First Republic leaders launched Nigeria to the respectable specter in the comity of nations. Under that system, Chief Obafemi Awolowo launched the first television station in Africa, ahead of France and many of today’s Western capitals.

The presidential system we adopted thereafter is also working for the United States of America. Under the system, America has become the most powerful country of the 21st Century. So, for us, especially in Nigeria, the fault is not in the name.

I would recommend that henceforth; an office seeker must publicly release his campaign manifesto which must be made actionable by law. A candidate who fails to actualise his or her manifesto should be tried the same way the Code of Conduct Tribunal prosecutes public officers for false asset declaration. Such a document should be filed at the High Court and attested to by a Judge of that court.

A situation where the constitution makes the president and governors chief executives without clear and realisable ways of holding them accountable is behind the failure of Western democracy in this clime. Even as President Obasanjo talked of democracy with links to African roots, he is equally aware that the Kabiyesi syndrome of the precolonial era did not stop the Oyo Empire from putting in place checks and balances for the Alaafin, the Kabiyesi (one who cannot be questioned), to the extent that the King (Alaafin) can be compelled to commit suicide. We have to agree that the Kabiyesi mentality adorned by today’s democratic rulers is a higher grade than what operated before colonialism and that remains the root of the nation’s underdevelopment.

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a modern and general interest Magazine with its Headquarters in Abuja. The Magazine has a remarkable difference in editorial philosophy and goals, it adheres strictly to the ethics of Journalism by using the finest ethos of the profession to promote peace among citizens; identifying and harnessing the nation’s vast resources; celebrating achievements of government agencies, individuals, groups and corporate organizations and above all, repositioning Nigeria for the needed growth and development. Time Nigeria gives emphasis to places and issues that have not been given adequate attention by others. The Magazine is national in outlook and is currently being read and patronized both in print and on our vibrant and active online platform (www.timenigeria.com).
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The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

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  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
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