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Gang-up Against Bello Mattawale By Gov. Dauda Lawal And His Cohorts

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By Joseph Akinola

From the time that Bello Matawalle was nominated as Minister OF the Federal Republic of Nigeria in 2023, Dauda Lawal the Governor of Zamfara State has been ill at ease.

The circumstances of his victory at the gubernatorial election as well as subsequent victory at the Election petition Tribunal did not give room for sound sleep. He knew that when pushing comes to shoving, the former Governor held the aces in the State politically.
Dauda Lawal having realised that it would be difficult to keep Matawalle’s new influence under check as Minister of State for Defence hatched another plan after his first moves to indict him through the cargo Airport controversy.This was to hoodwink a former aides to Matawalle who could provide information on his activities while in government.

This was what led to the unveiling of Bashir Hadejia, who we will dwell on later in the write-up.

The original plan was to paint Bello Matawalle black over his achievements as Governor of Zamfara between 2019 and 2023. This however failed flat as the people of the state knew the legacies he left. And so they were not buying into that. After failing to achieve this, Dauda Lawal Dare thought out other plans.

Our sources believe that the Zamfara Governor connected with the former Jigawa Governor who is presently the Minister of Defence and both of them agreed that it was in their interests to cut Matawalle to size because of his looming influence and good relationship with President Bola Tinubu.

They found a willing tool in Jackson Ude, a former presidential aide to Jonathan. Jackson Ude is a Nigerian journalist who has made a name for himself as a blackmailer. Not less than twenty different top Nigerians, including the DG of World Trade Organization, Ngozi Okonjo Iweala have either taken him to court and won or sued him.

Jackson Ude has since become a major ally of Zamfara Governor, Dauda Lawal. Together, they allegedly decided that the best way to tackle Matawalle growing influence in the Tinubu government was to continue to label him as backing the bandits and terrorists terrorizing the State he once governed.
Bello Matawalle’s rise in status and having become the poster boy of the Tinubu administration’s success in the Defence sector did not make his co-minister, Mohammed Badaru Abubakar comfortable. What you don’t have, you cannot give.

Many sources in the media confirmed that the two Ministers seemed to be opposites hence it was only a matter of time that their differences became obvious. According to our sources, while Matawalle would come to state what the Ministry was doing and encourage the troops and it’s leadership to do more, Badaru has never been a man who wanted visibility. He has always been too taciturn and withdrawn, as if sulking. So when the story came out that he was not too happy with the Minister of State for taking the shine off him, and aligning with Dauda Lawal to undermine Matawalle, not many people doubted it.

Sources claimed Badaru has grouses, with Tinubu appointing him as Defence Minister and not putting the Chiefs of Staff under him. It was also alleged that he was angry with the president because he wanted the FCT Ministry portfolio, which was given to Nyesom WIKE, a non- partyman. Abubakar Badaru, according to our sources felt he should have been given the portfolio of the FCT Ministry because he dropped his presidential ambition to support Tinubu when the President indicated interest in contesting.

Our source further revealed that Badaru, and Governor Lawal have teamed up to work and ensure that Matawalle is frustrated out of the Tinubu government so as to further dent whatever achievements the Tinubu government can claim to have while also denting Matawalle’s achievements.

Governor Lawal’s romance with terrorists is well known in the State despite all the air of arrogance he surrounds himself with as several pictures of his meetings and discussion abound everywhere on the social media.Impeccable sources gathered that Bello Turji works for the Zamfara Governor and the friends and allies of the bandits leader know this.

Sources confided in us that this is why it has been impossible for Bello Turji to be captured or killed as the State government virtually protects him, leaks information about troops movement if they have them and also support them with logistics. This explains why he makes so much noise and boasts of his invincibility.

Bello Turji’s MEN and other bandit leaders are also said to enjoy the same status as he enjoys.

Our sources also confirmed that Turji and a few other top bandits work for Dauda Lawal by ensuring his firm grip on the mining business in Zamfara.

Through them, the governor is alleged to have controlled a large chunk of the mining fields and also collected royalties on the governor’s behalf.

It is even alleged in some circles that some of the late bandits leaders eliminated by the military in its recent onslaught were bagkeepers for the governor who kept his money especially from the mines hence the reason why he was not too happy with their death and their elimination was not celebrated by the state.

Our sources also linked a powerful former NSA from the state with the gold mining business in the state.

According to the sources, because of their vested interest, the powerful NSA who retired from the military as a general would do anything to ensure that his mining interests are protected in Zamfara hence the move to support the Governor and ensure that the top bandits who protect their vested interests are not touched. These gang-up believe that any attempt by Matawalle to upset the applecart in the mining sectors of the state will affect their vested interests since it is the bandits who are protecting their interests there and they need the continued presence of the bandits to ward off government prying eyes.

The implications of all these are germane here.
Key stakeholders in Zamfara state who ordinarily should be working for the success of the military are working at cross-purposes with the security apparatus of the state.

They are not ready to allow the security agencies operate. Rather, they work against them. They not only do this, they give out information against the security agencies to bandits and terrorists who through this organise ambushes for the security agencies all ina bid to paint the Minister of State Defence in bad light as well as maintain their strangle hold on the mining sector in the state.

Frightening Dimensions
The recruitment of Bashir Hadejia as well as the Minister of Defence, Abubakar Badaru, into this dastardly group constitutes a frightening dimensions to a problem that was hitherto localized. Our sources revealed that Bashir Hadejia was born in Niger Republic and maintains a home there just like the Defence Minister Abubakar Badaru.

Having worked with Bello Matawalle, he understands the workings of the former Governor’s network as well as what he did to curb the excesses of the bandits while in power.

That Bashir Hadejia, working with Governor Dauda Lawal were able to cladenstinely sponsor anti- Nigerian protests during the August 1-10 protests in Nigeria signify the extent of their hatred for the country and its constitued authority. Though they set out to embarrass the Minister of State for Defence, and by implications the Tinubu government, the move showed the extent the Dauda Lawal gang-up could go in portraying Matawalle in bad light and their cause.

Having recruited a notorious journalist who does not operate in the country, yet spews outright lies and also thrive on blackmail, no wonder they have dominated the cyber space with unverifiable stories upon stories against the Minister of State, Bello Matawalle.

Joseph Akinola, a political analyst based in Abuja

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a modern and general interest Magazine with its Headquarters in Abuja. The Magazine has a remarkable difference in editorial philosophy and goals, it adheres strictly to the ethics of Journalism by using the finest ethos of the profession to promote peace among citizens; identifying and harnessing the nation’s vast resources; celebrating achievements of government agencies, individuals, groups and corporate organizations and above all, repositioning Nigeria for the needed growth and development. Time Nigeria gives emphasis to places and issues that have not been given adequate attention by others. The Magazine is national in outlook and is currently being read and patronized both in print and on our vibrant and active online platform (www.timenigeria.com).
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The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

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  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. 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It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
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