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National Grid or National Greed? Unmasking the Saboteurs of Nigeria’s Power Sector

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I documented that visit in a piece published on this page on February 27, 2024, under the headline: “The darkness called Nigeria”. While the government plant generates 100 megawatts of its 500 megawatts capacity, the private plant generates 461 megawatts. Now, the arrangement is that for any megawatt the private plant generates which the Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN) cannot transmit to the National Grid, the TCN entered into a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with the private plant and pays an average of $30 million every month!

By Suyi Ayodele

Anyone may want to believe that we have genuine insurmountable problems with our National Grid. I don’t share that opinion. I know, with the hindsight of a singular experience, that whatever is wrong with our National Grid is deliberate, a result of our personal greed! The National Grid collapses at will because there is a calculated attempt put in place to satisfy the greed of some Nigerians. In essence, what we are experiencing in terms of power outages occasioned by a malfunctioning National Grid is the work of profiteering vampires whose greed has remained insatiable!

In February this year, I was in the entourage of the Minister of Power, Adedayo Adelabu, to a GENCO in Ihovbor Community, Benin City. The minister’s mission to the community was to inspect the power-generating plant located in the agrarian community.

The plant, which goes by the name, Ihovbor Power Plant or Benin Power Generating Company, is owned by the Niger Delta Power Holding Company (NDPHC). It was set up in May 2013, as “an open cycle gas turbine power plant built to accommodate future Conversion to Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) configuration.”

The government-owned power plant, when fully operated, can generate 500 megawatts of power for evacuation (transmission) to the National Grid. The minister said that the plant “is a brand new one.” Unfortunately, new as the Ihovbor Power Plant is, it transmits nothing to the National Grid because its turbines are perpetually shut down for its neighbouring plant owned by some individuals to work.

I documented that visit in a piece published on this page on February 27, 2024, under the headline: “The darkness called Nigeria”. While the government plant generates 100 megawatts of its 500 megawatts capacity, the private plant generates 461 megawatts. Now, the arrangement is that for any megawatt the private plant generates which the Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN) cannot transmit to the National Grid, the TCN entered into a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with the private plant and pays an average of $30 million every month!

This is where the complication arises. The government shuts down its own power plant to allow a private plant to function and then goes ahead to pay a whopping sum of $30 million for megawatts that are generated but not transmitted. The private plant, to add insult to our national injury, runs on the facilities of the government owned plant! If you ask a multi-billionaire, I know, to describe this situation, he will simply tell you it is a case of someone helping someone!

Incidentally, the NDPHC, which owns the Ihovbor Power Plant in Benin City, has nine other such plants in Omotoso, Olorunsogo, Calabar, Geregu, Omoku, Gbaron, Sapele and Enugu. All these plants, if optimally used, will generate 4,700 megawatts of power!

The questions we should ask is: How many of such government owned plants are working? How many privately owned plants are getting $30 million PPA every month at the expense of our public plants? Who are the owners of the private plants? Who are their partners in government and out of government?

And before we think that private power generation and distribution is rocket science, I present to you the experience of the CCETC Ossiomo Power Company LTD, Benin City, which was initiated by the immediate past Governor Godwin Obaseki of Edo State, as an Independent Power Project (IPP). It was a fierce battle before the project saw the light of the day. The Benin Electricity Distribution Company (BEDC) management fought tooth and nail to frustrate the project.

In one of the meetings between the National Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) and the Edo State Government, Obaseki practically walked the then Managing Director of the BEDC out of the Government House. Obaseki succeeded with the Private Power Project because of his tenacity of purpose. Today, all Edo State Government offices in Benin City are connected to the Ossiomo power supply and they have good stories to tell.

The example of Ossiomo is a definition of a focused government. What Obaseki demonstrated is rugged political will and the determination to make a difference and place the people above any other consideration. The same feat was replicated in Enugu a few months ago.

Why can’t we have as many Ossiomo across the nation? Why do we rely on a National Grid that is suffering from epilepsy? The answer is very clear: GREED! The National Grid needs to collapse as many times as possible so that the fat maggots of power generating profiteers can get their monthly $30 million PPA for power generated but not transmitted.

To fix whatever problems we have with our National Grid, we need to first address and permanently fix the problem of our National Greed! What solution do I recommend? I commend the managers of our power industry to take a tutorial from the resilience of the Nigerian Tribune, our inimitable Elephant (Ajanaku), huge as a hill, even in a crouching posture! At 75, Tribune is still waxing stronger and remains resolute, keeping fidelity with the mission and vision of its founder! When we stop treating our National Grid like the proverbial Ìwòfà àdáwó jo yá (jointly owned Ìwòfà – pawn), Nigerians will begin to experience uninterrupted power supply. That is hugely doable! -Suyi Ayodele Tribune Newspaper

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a modern and general interest Magazine with its Headquarters in Abuja. The Magazine has a remarkable difference in editorial philosophy and goals, it adheres strictly to the ethics of Journalism by using the finest ethos of the profession to promote peace among citizens; identifying and harnessing the nation’s vast resources; celebrating achievements of government agencies, individuals, groups and corporate organizations and above all, repositioning Nigeria for the needed growth and development. Time Nigeria gives emphasis to places and issues that have not been given adequate attention by others. The Magazine is national in outlook and is currently being read and patronized both in print and on our vibrant and active online platform (www.timenigeria.com).
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The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

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  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
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