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Policy Matters: Between Tinubu and Atiku

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By Taiwo Adisa

Exactly a week ago, former Vice President Atiku Abubakar took out President Bola Tinubu’s policies and gave them uncomplimentary tags. He condemned the hasty implementation of the subsidy removal programme and the bullish implementation of the foreign exchange policy of the Central Bank of Nigeria, which has taken the Naira from about N600 to $1 to about N1,700 to $1 as counter-productive to social welfare, and “trial-and-error economic policies” that have orchestrated “excruciating pain” for Nigerians.

In a detailed analysis of almost all of the critical aspects of the administration’s policy initiatives, Atiku advocated a gradualist approach to the fuel subsidy removal and backed up his argument with examples from Malaysia and Indonesia, where such policies were phased.

While admitting that he also advocated fuel subsidy removal as a policy on the campaign trail, Atiku said: “Yes, I have always advocated for the removal of subsidy on PMS because its administration has been mildly put, opaque with so much scope for arbitrariness and corruption. Mind boggling rent profit from oil subsidy accrued to the cabals in public institutions and the private sector.”

He, thereafter, advocated four key steps Tinubu should have taken. One is the need to the fight corruption in the oil sector by reforming the NNPCL, which he said has been a part of the problem; next is the need to shore up the refining capacity of the country, by refining at least 50% of its production and dominating the West African market with 50% of the refined products; a gradual subsidy removal that could take some years, as in Malaysia and Indonesia and the fourth being the implementation of a robust social protection programme.

Atiku also highlighted how he would have implemented a $10 billion Economic Stimulus Fund (ESF),to support MSMEs across all economic sectors and another $25 billion Infrastructure Development Fund(IDF), which he said would have hit the ground running by putting the building blocks for a private sector-driven infrastructure development.

On foreign exchange management, Atiku advocated a gradualist approach and specifically “a managed-floating system.” He said: “We would have sequenced my reforms to achieve fiscal and monetary congruence. Unleashing reforms to determine an appropriate exchange rate, cost-reflective electricity tariff, and PMS price at one and the same time is certainly an overkill. Add CBN’s bullish money tightening spree. As importer of PMS and other petroleum products, removing subsidy on these products without a stable exchange rate would be counterproductive.”

In its reply to Atiku, the Presidency, which spoke through the Special Adviser on Information and Strategy, Mr. Bayo Onanuga said that the former Vice President’s ideas would have worsened the nation’s woes.

“While advocating for gradual reforms may sound appealing, Tinubu took measures that should have been implemented decades ago by Alhaji Abubakar and his boss [Olusegun Obasanjo] when they had the opportunity,” Onanuga said in a statement he issued on November 3, the same day Atiku’s tweets were posted.

Recall that Tinubu’s administration has been dogged by his “subsidy is gone” declaration on the inauguration day, which was followed by the unified foreign exchange policy, another euphemism for Naira devaluation. While the president’s spokesman admitted “temporary difficulties” he branded Atiku’s submissions as cheap talk.

According to Onanuga: “Firstly, Alhaji Atiku’s ideas, which lacked detail, were rejected by Nigerians in the 2023 election. Had he won, we believe he would have plunged Nigeria into a worse situation or overseen a regime of cronyism.

“Abubakar lost the election partly because he vowed to sell the NNPC and other assets to his friends. Nigerians have not forgotten this, nor would they be comforted by Atiku’s track record when he managed the economy during President Olusegun Obasanjo’s first term from 1999 to 2003.

“As Vice President, Atiku oversaw a questionable privatisation programme. He and his boss showed little faith in our educational system, establishing their universities while allowing others to decline. Despite his futile attempt to mislead Nigerians again in his statement, it is telling that the former Vice President could not dispute the economic reforms pursued by the Tinubu administration because they are the right course of action.”

The Presidency added that Atiku’s proposal of a gradual approach demonstrated his lack of awareness of the “severe issues President Tinubu inherited,” declaring that it was easy for Atiku to present “a flowery to-do list.”

Though the back and forth between the Presidency and Atiku went further as Atiku released another follow-up statement on Monday November 4, I believe that the government missed a great opportunity to succinctly communicate its policies to Nigerians. Today, if you ask many Nigerians about the details of Tinubu’s programmes, what they would reel out are the components of the “excruciating pain” Atiku talked about. And rehearsing Obasanjo/Atiku scorecard cannot help the government in anyway because the statistics out there would show that living standards were better under the Obasanjo/Atiku administration.

Though the Minister of Finance, Wale Edun, had revealed details of the president’s eight-point agenda in August 2023, not many can recall the exact components of that agenda. What we have seen since May 29, 2023 include galloping inflation, job losses, shutting down factories, companies relocating, under performing Naira, persistent fuel price increase and consistent rise in cost of food and drugs. Even though, Edun, had admitted in August 2023 that the 24 percent inflation rate Tinubu inherited from President Muhammadu Buhari was unacceptable, the Tinubu administration has taken inflation well beyond 30 percent mark, while interest rates kept rising as well.

As much as we expect the government to defend its line against Atiku, one does not expect personal attacks on the Adamawa politician. What we expect is a robust conversation that would have educated Nigerians about the policy trusts of the contending parties. For instance, why did Tinubu make the “subsidy is gone” declaration when he has nothing on ground to cushion the effects? That’s a misstep which even the military did not dare. As things turned out, that declaration has worsened socio-economic challenges. Many would want to ask, where are the benefits of the “subsidy is gone” declaration, one and a half years after? If a policy is supposed to last four years, are we not supposed to have started seeing the benefits mid-way into the tenure? What happened to the advertised ERGP reforms of the Buhari administration? If Buhari’s ERGP achieved nothing in eight years, where is the assurance that Tinubu’s reforms would fare better? How long does a people need to endure painful reforms before they reach the eldorado? Answers to these were missing in the response by the presidency.

I think our democracy has long suffered from policies that are malnourished in conception and implementation. The unfortunate thing is that the policy implimentor would go scot-free no matter how badly he leaves the people at the end of the experiments. The undue assumption that a president’s ideas or that of the governor of a state would instantly transform the nation or the state from the woods has remained unhelpful to this democracy. Rather than subject the politicians’ ideas to formal and informal debates, ahead of the elections, our countrymen prefer to gather in ceremonial attires during campaigns and dance away the truth. Drumbeats, drama and short speeches characterise the campaign scenes where no one interrogates the “lofty” contained in the manifestoes being circulated by surrogates. The candidates mumble some highly inaudible messages, sing, crack jokes or fire shots at opponents and leave for the next location. He talks in general terms all through the campaigns and while in office, he would discover that he was holding aloft an empty calabash. And because the constitution does not expressly prescribe consequences for bad leadership, one leader after the has come and left the people worse-off.

What I will recommend is that henceforth, a candidate’s manifesto should be made his bound. Once a candidate wins either the presidency, the governorship or council chairmanship seat, his or her manifesto should be submitted to the parliament which would legislate the same into law, thereby making it justiceable. The document would, therefore, become an instrument to measure performance on an annual basis. It could constitute an avenue for impeachment of the office holder and possible prosecution after office. That way, no office holder would have the temerity to take the people for a ride or embark on ceremonial governance in four or eight years, as the case may be.

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a modern and general interest Magazine with its Headquarters in Abuja. The Magazine has a remarkable difference in editorial philosophy and goals, it adheres strictly to the ethics of Journalism by using the finest ethos of the profession to promote peace among citizens; identifying and harnessing the nation’s vast resources; celebrating achievements of government agencies, individuals, groups and corporate organizations and above all, repositioning Nigeria for the needed growth and development. Time Nigeria gives emphasis to places and issues that have not been given adequate attention by others. The Magazine is national in outlook and is currently being read and patronized both in print and on our vibrant and active online platform (www.timenigeria.com).
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The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

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  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
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