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Systemic Greed and Endless National Grid Collapse

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The Minister of Power, Adebayo Adelabu, must have expected plaudits when he announced last week that the Federal Government would soon add 150 Megawatts to its power generation. The minister, who had attributed the feat to the planned completion of the pilot phase of the Siemens-led Presidential Power Initiative, must have reckoned that even though the pilot phase of the power initiative was coming to a head at the time the entire project was supposed to have been delivered, the fact that additional megawatts were going to be added to the power supply chain should titivate Nigerians. But the news that broke in the early afternoon of that day made sure no one digested the implication of his story. The National Grid had suffered yet another collapse, and that had taken the wind off the minister’s sail. So Nigerians only allowed the news to slide.

News of National Grid collapse these days is a constant killjoy. Amidst Nigerians’ struggle with the different troubles emanating from the various power sector Bands, the sector has added another monthly dosage in National Grid Collapse. Whatever made Nigerians write off NEPA as something that may never yield any good news was almost becoming child splay when compared to the fate of our countrymen in the hands of its successors including PHCN, Discos, Gencos, and TCN. So it was understandable that Nigerians largely ignored the “cheering” news the minister made public on the sidelines of the visit of German President, Frank Walter Steinmeier, last week.

Even when Adelabu told newsmen: “When phase one is complete, Nigeria’s power grid will not remain the same. This project will redefine grid stability and efficiency across the country,” Nigerians only looked the other way.

Just before Adelabu’s revelation, that same day, December 11, a tweet from Nigeria’s National Grid had confirmed the 12th collapse of the grid, this year. If that should be the last this year, we would have had at least one grid collapse for every calendar month of 2024. That is more than depressing, especially for estimated billing customers, who are in the majority, considering that each collapse lasts between three and five days at the minimum. “The major grid setback had occurred and the restoration is to commence,” the grid managers said on Wednesday. An official of the Jos Disco, Dr. Friday Elijah added: “We hope to restore normal power supply to our esteemed customers as soon as the grid supply is restored to normalcy.” You can be sure that no one banked on such an unhelpful refrain they’ve been used to over the years.

Despite that the power sector has offered little or nothing to cheer in recent years, reports coming from the Senate, are, however threatening to compound the depth of dejection. On December 5, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Power, Senator Enyinnaya Abaribe submitted a report which indicted actors in the power sector of practically fleecing the nation and its citizens. One such news was the report that the nation requires the sum of $25 million or N42 billion to restart the grid each time it collapses. And to think that we have lost such a sum 12 times this year! The report called for “decisive actions” by the government on the saboteurs, including making those within and outside the system pay for their culpability.

One Senator after the other, it was condemnation upon condemnation for the power sector, as Abaribe reeled out the details of his committee’s report. Senate President Godswill Akpabio questioned why governments and communities buy transformers, hand the same over to Discos, and are still asked to pay for installation. He did not add that a month after the installation, the community is served bills, while some characters bearing huge ladders on their shoulders menacingly parade the streets, looking for customers to disconnect for failing to pay the bills.

“The people who took over (power sector) are just making money from those transformers and they are not adding value,” Akpabio said. Other Senators accused the different legs of the power sector of making profit and making Nigerians suffer, while some accused them of collecting money for services they did not render. While all the comments by the distinguished Senators were descriptive of the happenings in the power sector, one dangerous clincher dropped by Akpabio would demand further scrutiny. An enraged Akpabio had told the Senate: “We can make the laws, we can reverse the laws and ask the Federal Government to take back those things (power sector) from them.” That’s a dangerous conclusion to make as it would amount to throwing away the baby and the birth water.

President Goodluck Jonathan perfected the privatisation process of the sector in 2013, some eight years after the passage of the Power Sector Reform Bill, 2005 by the National Assembly. While the privatisation had to be done, the government’s determination came against stiff labour resistance. In effect, almost all the financial gains made by the administration were used to placate the labour in the sector. The good thing is that private hands now control Gencos and Discos.

But unlike the quick fix that the privatization of the telecommunications sector proved to be, the power sector came with huge liabilities. Many of the successful companies that took over the Discos were only apparently moved by the possibility of huge financial gains. They lacked the technical ability and offshore support base and financial ability to turn things around. They made no efforts to change transformers, and old cables, or electrify new areas. They made no efforts to meter their customers and preferred to apply the estimated billing methods just to fleece the people. Rather than mobilise offshore funds with pliable interest rate regimes, they mobilised funds locally, with attendant galloping interests in a short time. What happened is that the companies started falling by the wayside, and the Asset Management Company of Nigeria (AMCON) had to come to the rescue.

In truth, something was wrong with the privatisation process. But throwing away the baby and the birth water won’t solve the problems. Senator Abaribe, a veteran Chairman of the Power Committee had once described the problems afflicting the sector by saying “For all have sinned…” That, to him, indicates that the regulatory agencies, the parastatals in the sector, and the government share a bit of the problem. Why is it difficult to have every electricity customer metered? Why allow estimated billing? Why would governments and communities donate transformers and cables to Discos without being refunded? Is electricity a business or social service? If we have taken it as a business, every material donated by stakeholders has to be accounted for or repaid with equivalent kilowatts of power.

Above all, the government and other stakeholders have to get hold of those responsible for the endless collapse of the national grid. If the nation has to spend a whopping N42 billion to restart the system after every collapse, no one needs a soothsayer to tell that the economy cannot withstand the reckless greed. The government must get hold of whichever forces are responsible for the perennial grid collapse and save the nation from unmitigated greed. And it must be stopped now.

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a modern and general interest Magazine with its Headquarters in Abuja. The Magazine has a remarkable difference in editorial philosophy and goals, it adheres strictly to the ethics of Journalism by using the finest ethos of the profession to promote peace among citizens; identifying and harnessing the nation’s vast resources; celebrating achievements of government agencies, individuals, groups and corporate organizations and above all, repositioning Nigeria for the needed growth and development. Time Nigeria gives emphasis to places and issues that have not been given adequate attention by others. The Magazine is national in outlook and is currently being read and patronized both in print and on our vibrant and active online platform (www.timenigeria.com).
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The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

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  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
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