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Tinubu’s IGP, CG Tenure Extensions: Shielding Lawbreakers, Entrenching Corruption

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*Introduction — When Extension Becomes Endorsement*

By Bolaji O. Akinyemi

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s decision to extend the tenures of both the Inspector General of Police (IGP) and the Comptroller General (CG) of Customs is not just a policy misjudgment — it is an endorsement of illegality and a deliberate lengthening of an era already tainted by fraud, administrative malpractice, and institutional decay.

The facts are in the public domain. In the case of the IGP, the breach is direct: Section 18(8) of the Police Act 2020 prescribes compulsory retirement for any officer who has served 35 years or attained the age of 60, whichever comes first. The current IGP has crossed that threshold. His continued stay in office rests on no constitutional or statutory foundation — it is an illegality sustained only by presidential fiat.

In the case of the CG, the breach is deeper and darker. This is not merely about tenure, but about the enabling of financial and procedural irregularities that undermine the national economy.

Part I — The IGP: Law Subverted, Rights Violated

The Police Act is clear; there is no ambiguity. Yet, Tinubu has chosen to keep in place an IGP whose tenure expired by law, thereby subverting statutory provisions and weakening the rule of law he swore to uphold.

This is not an isolated legal breach. The IGP’s tenure has been marked by acts that suggest a pattern of disregard for lawful authority and fundamental rights. The most recent example is the arrest and reported assault of activist Omoyele Sowore on August 7, 2025. Sowore alleges that officers from the IGP Monitoring Unit broke into his detention cell, fractured his right hand, and whisked him away to an undisclosed location. If verified, this would constitute unlawful assault, abuse of detention powers, and a direct violation of Sections 34 and 35 of the Nigerian Constitution, which guarantee the right to dignity and personal liberty.

This is the man whose tenure Tinubu has chosen to prolong — in defiance of the law and against the grain of democratic accountability.

Part II — The CG: Senate Committee’s Allegations of Fraud and Illegality

On the economic front, the Comptroller General’s continued stay in office raises equally grave concerns. In a recent public session of the Senate Committee on the Economy, Rtd Assistant Comptoller General of Customs, Francis Adenigba Fadahunsi who should know better the operation metrics of the Customs Service. Now a Senator of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, interestingly representing, Osun East Senatorial District, popularly known as (Ife/ Ijesa), which is the Senatorial District of Mr CG, Bashir Adewale Adeniyi. The Senator of Mr CG, openly declared that the CG has been operating under illegality since June 2023 — specifically on the matter of the 4% Free on Board (FOB) revenue regime.

 “If anybody takes this thing to court, they will win because we have been working on illegality since June 2023,”

— Senator Ade Fadahunsi.

The Senate’s position is clear: the CG has continued to enforce a revenue formula that lacks legislative backing, despite warnings to seek amendment. The committee’s advice was straightforward — if the law is unworkable, return it for amendment. Instead, the CG persisted, walking a legal tightrope that, by the committee’s own admission, will not survive judicial challenge.

Beyond legal non-compliance, the committee also hinted at fraudulent practices. On the computation of insurance and freight charges, the Committee queried:

 “Is it the importers that are giving them, or they generate it on their own platform? That suggests fraud.”

Part III — Smuggling, Lost Revenue, and Ministerial Negligence

The Senate report also tied the CG’s administration to rampant smuggling — particularly in the North — that is bleeding Nigeria’s export potential. Dangote cement, among other goods, is reportedly sold freely in neighbouring countries at prices lower than domestic rates, the difference driven by manipulation of the 2% CBN revenue deposit.

The supervising minister did not escape criticism. The Senate accused him of failing to exercise adequate oversight, pointing to budgetary waste, inflated capital allocations, and misplaced priorities such as establishing new institutions instead of strengthening existing ones.

With a capital budget leap from ₦706 billion in 2024 to ₦1.1 trillion in 2025, the committee saw “frivolities” where there should have been economic reform. The warning was stark: in five years, a knowledge gap will cripple the service if current recruitment and capacity building are not addressed.

Part IV — The Presidential Burden

In both the IGP and CG cases, the problem is not simply the illegality of extended tenure — it is the President’s willing choice to stand by men whose records now carry the taint of lawlessness and suspected fraud.

The law is not silent. Section 5 of the Constitution vests executive powers in the President, but those powers are to be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and the law. By ignoring statutory limits and condoning apparent breaches of economic and administrative order, Tinubu risks transforming the Presidency from a guarantor of legality to a patron of impunity. While waiting to find a legal solution to the IGP issue. I will from next week focus on the CG extension. There is enough material to serve you a delightful read on the underhand activities of the Customs Service. Watch out for:

CG Customs; providing facts; establishin President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s Extension of Fraud.

Conclusion — From Legality to Legitimacy

Tenure extension in the face of legal expiry is not a harmless administrative act. It is a conscious decision to trade legality for loyalty, and competence for complicity. In doing so, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has deepened Nigeria’s credibility crisis — both in the fight against corruption and in the defence of democratic norms.

If Nigeria is to reclaim its institutions, it must begin by ending the culture of prolonged illegality and refusing to extend the life of a fraudulent era. Anything less will ensure that the rope on which we walk is not just tight, but already fraying.

Dr. Bolaji O. Akinyemi is an Apostle and Nation Builder. He’s also President Voice of His Word Ministries and Convener Apostolic Round Table. BoT Chairman, Project Victory Call Initiative, AKA PVC Naija. He is a strategic Communicator and the C.E.O, Masterbuilder Communications.

Email:bolajiakinyemi66@gmail.com
Facebook:Bolaji Akinyemi.
X:Bolaji O Akinyemi
Instagram:bolajioakinyemi
Phone:+2348033041236

   

About author
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This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. 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The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. 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