Cover StoryOpinionPerspectivePolitics

Nigerian Politics: Now that Governors Yearn Earnestly For APC (GOYEAP)

7 Mins read

In the immediate period that preceded the return of Nigeria to democratic rule in 1999, the political space was dominated by one youth group called the Youths Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA). It was led by Daniel Kanu, a young man who was known for his connections among the men in Khaki. He was ebullient and vocal. His campaign was egregious.

By Taiwo Adisa

In the immediate period that preceded the return of Nigeria to democratic rule in 1999, the political space was dominated by one youth group called the Youths Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA). It was led by Daniel Kanu, a young man who was known for his connections among the men in Khaki. He was ebullient and vocal. His campaign was egregious.

Kanu held sway in the campaign to get the iron-fisted ruler, the late Gen. Sani Abacha transmuted from a military head of state to a civilian president. His group led the million-man marches and all such rallies across the country. Also linked to the activities of YEAA were the antics of the five registered political parties of that era, something that yielded the famous “five fingers of a leprous hand”, a quote from the late Attorney General and Minister of Justice, and a leader of the Pan-Yoruba socio-political organisation, Afenifere, Chief Bola Ige. If humans are permitted to have six fingers, maybe YEAA would be the sixth of the acclaimed leprous hand. YEAA’s momentum was huge, and the strategy was all-encompassing. They were all aimed at making dictator Abacha, an agbada-wearing civilian president. The bubble burst in 1998, and General Abdusalami Abubakar rescued an almost transfixed country from the grip of the leprous hand and its YEAA campaigners.

Today, after 25 years of democratic governance, the civic environment is wearing the looks of the old, though there are differences in the modus operandi. We also have to note that Abacha, as the head of state during the pre-Fourth Republic era, was more or less a power usurper who hijacked the popular mandate that had been given to the late Chief MKO Abiola through the June 12, 1993, election. Therefore, distinct from Abacha’s YEAA, what we are seeing now is what I will call Governors Yearn Earnestly for APC (GOYEAP). You can add the letter C or remain silent about it. In their numbers, governors are shredding the flags of their political parties and adopting the broom, the symbol of the ruling APC. Political scholars and stakeholders would have time to go deeper into this issue. But for now, we can ask the question, why do governors defect? Legally speaking, the defection of a governor is not envisaged by the 1999 Constitution (as amended); thus, a window exists for the politician to explore. Going by the dictates of the same constitution under reference, the governor of a state is regarded as the chief executive of that state. In practical terms, he is the overlord for the things on the face of the earth and beneath within that jurisdiction. He even controls some elements in the air (as the lordship pleases), if we must borrow the language of court chambers. In real terms, he dispenses favours as he wills and determines the ward Councilors, members of the Houses of Assembly, the House of Representatives candidates of his party, and the Senators. If his party is that popular in the area, it will win all those positions, and that means he has a sizeable voice in the nation’s legislature. He, therefore, controls his state and a part of the federal system. Maybe that would explain why presidents of this era are careful with the governors. Because an alliance of the 36, or most of them, could speak to his fate.

If a man should wield all the powers of a governor as enumerated, why should he not become an Eruobodo, like the Yoruba would say? The river is never afraid; it is he who wants to swim in the river that needs to think twice. That is how the Yoruba depict such a man in the realm of power. But the things we are seeing lately appear to be reversing that age-old saying of the elders. Last week, the governor of Plateau State, Caleb Muftwang, a member of the Peoples Democratic Party, engaged in a war of words with members of the APC in his state over claims by the governor that he faced pressure to join the APC. Leaders of the APC then fired back at the governor, asking him to name those who put him under the said pressure. Remember that the governor of Osun State, Senator Ademola Adeleke, was once caught in a defection dilemma that got terminated when Senator Iyiola Omisore accused him of trying to join the party through the back door.

Outside these two cases, the defection saga among governors has remained the centre of state politics in recent months. We have seen the governors of Delta, Akwa-Ibom, Enugu, and Bayelsa announce their defections from the PDP to the ruling APC. Even at that, some stakeholders believed that we have not heard the final word on the defection cruise, as more PDP governors seem to have caught the defection bug. While some people can accommodate the defection of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, even though such an act is forbidden by the 1999 Constitution, whose Section 68 (1g) spells out the difficult conditions that could guarantee defection in the legislature, seeing governors defect should be a rarity. The fact that governors are leaving their comfort zones in droves these days should again prompt this question: Why do governors defect?

In politics, defections could be for different reasons. There are defections meant to save one’s political life. That could be the case when a godfather is breathing down the neck of a godson and trying to deny him a second term ticket. That was the case with Mallam Mala Kachala of Borno State in 2002. But none of the governors who had defected recently is seen in any such straights. The governor of Enugu is known to be his own godfather, while that of Delta is in a chubby relationship with his predecessor. That of Bayelsa is in his second term, while there are no known threats to the governor of Akwa-Ibom. But all of them have packed their kaya and left for the APC. There could be more to their actions, and there is certainly more to it. But if we must apportion blame, we should be laying the fault on the doorsteps of the nature of political parties we run in this era and the process of leadership recruitment of the Fourth Republic. When politics is almost becoming a merchandising product, you don’t expect principles and ideologies to reside in there. When power acquisition is almost a trading commodity, ‘anything goes’ shall be the guiding light. But I will not support any claim to the effect that the defecting governors were being coerced behind the scenes. That is a huge fallacy. And then our leaders say that if your hands are clean, you fear no foe. If you’ve done nothing to warrant inquiry, why run from pillar to post? After all, the leader of the APC, President Bola Tinubu, whom they are seeking to please, is a good example of a man who withstood pressure from the central government in his days as governor. He stayed the course, built a party, formed alliances, and found himself at the peak. The rest of the interpretation of the emerging scenario should be left for political scholars to disaggregate.

But things were not like this at the beginning of the nation’s democratic journey. The first-generation politicians, who midwifed the nation’s push for independence, exhibited little or none of such transmutation traits. These days, however, it seems as if the farther we move away from the year of independence, the closer our politicians move towards zero ideological orientation. Yes, the military seized much of the post-independence years, because they allowed democracy to thrive for only six years, but the Second Republic provided us with the measurement scale. The five parties that ruled the airwaves during the Second Republic had clear leaders whom people looked up to for their ideology and vision. The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) was a social democratic party that never hid its progressive bent. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was conservative, multi-ethnic, and centrist, while the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP), like the UPN, was a progressive party with social democratic tendencies. Its offspring, the Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP), which emerged following a leadership tussle in the ranks of the original party, also exhibited progressive ideals and projected itself as the enclave of progressivism in the North. The People Redemption Party (PRP) wore its social democratic tendencies on the forehead of its leaders, by displaying attributes tending towards populism and the working class.

Notwithstanding the Jagba tactics (wrestle it) displayed by the NPN in some territories during the 1983 electioneering, when it lured some key opposition figures into its fold in a bid to take over some states, the political parties retained their original outlook, with their membership largely intact.

These days, defection is the name of the game. Many would have lost count of the times when that word was mentioned on the floor of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Luckily for us, the newspapers provided reports on Friday that the ruling All Progressives Congress had attained a two-thirds majority in the Green Chamber. The figure had also been attained in the Red Chamber (Senate). When lawmakers defect, they know they run afoul of the constitution, but they play on the peculiarity of the Nigerian situation. If you take them to court, the case may remain on the cause list for years after the tenure. Yes, some cases have been determined, which should give some clue to the determination of any fresh cases, but we don’t know the way of the courts, and not being learned, we cannot question mi Lords.

So, who will save the Fourth Republic from the throes of defection politics? The dashboard where that answer is etched would remain blurry until God knows when. But, the leaders of the political parties can start by clearing the Aegean’s table. Standardise the membership cards of your parties, so touts won’t be hoarded somewhere to determine party candidates; stop giving tickets for elective offices to the highest bidder, and sensitise your members to always vote conscientiously during primaries. If we start with such basic steps and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) also complements that with a firm electoral procedure that emphasises the sanctity of votes, we should be guaranteed a setting closer at least, in colour, to what obtained in the aborted Second Republic.

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a modern and general interest Magazine with its Headquarters in Abuja. The Magazine has a remarkable difference in editorial philosophy and goals, it adheres strictly to the ethics of Journalism by using the finest ethos of the profession to promote peace among citizens; identifying and harnessing the nation’s vast resources; celebrating achievements of government agencies, individuals, groups and corporate organizations and above all, repositioning Nigeria for the needed growth and development. Time Nigeria gives emphasis to places and issues that have not been given adequate attention by others. The Magazine is national in outlook and is currently being read and patronized both in print and on our vibrant and active online platform (www.timenigeria.com).
Articles
Related posts
All The NewsCover StoryNewsPolitics

Musa Tsoken Congratulates Kalu on Daily Times’ Lawmaker of the Year Award

1 Mins read
The National Coordinator of the Asiwaju Again Renewed Hope Support Initiative 2027 and National President of the APC Initiative for Good Governance…
Abuja FileDevelopmentEconomyEnergyFinanceInside LagosOpinionPerspective

The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

6 Mins read
  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
Cover StoryNewsSports

Union Bank, AIICO Multishield, Checkers Custard, Others Back 5th Cycling Lagos

2 Mins read
Union Bank of Nigeria Plc, AIICO Multishield, Checkers Custard and other corporate organisations have thrown their weight behind the 5th Cycling Lagos,…
Stay on the loop!

Subscribe to our latest news.

Leave a Reply

WP2Social Auto Publish Powered By : XYZScripts.com