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Have WAEC and Amotekun Overstayed Their Welcome?

5 Mins read

 

By Taiwo Adisa, PhD

The lapses experienced by students across various regions during the May/June West African Examinations Council (WAEC) exams in 2025 highlighted significant concerns within the examination body. Delays in delivering exam papers to schools and prolonged waiting times for students before they could begin their exams signaled that WAEC was struggling to fulfill its responsibilities. Although that was the first time such widespread issues occurred, parents, guardians, and students chose to forgive WAEC, trusting its assurances that future exams would proceed smoothly. However, this year, the extensive irregularities affecting schools, students, and teachers have revealed that the promises made last year have unraveled.

Once again, the signs were evident. On May 13, 2026, just days before the examinations began, workers at WAEC, under the Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated Institutions (NASU), initiated a three-day industrial action to demand better working conditions. Media reports indicated that workers picketed WAEC offices nationwide, including the national headquarters in Yaba, Lagos, to press their demands. Mr. Kayode Ogunyade, Chairman of the NASU WAEC chapter, stated at the start of the strike that “the protest is to press home our demands and get management back to the table,” emphasizing that the action was meant to highlight the growing frustrations of workers.

Although the strike was suspended three days later, with WAEC assuring the public of a smooth May/June 2026 examination, the warnings from the workers were clear. Reports began to surface that WAEC exams were once again plagued by serious issues. Last year, some centers conducted exams until midnight; this year, the situation was even worse. A school with 100 students scheduled to take a Mathematics paper received only 20 question papers. Invigilators had no choice but to group the students and ask them to share a single question paper per group, a scandalous situation that no one could have anticipated.

Additionally, there were significant delays in administering various papers. For instance, the Physics papers scheduled between 2 PM and 5 PM on Monday did not conclude until 10 PM in parts of Lagos, Ogun, and Oyo States. The same delays occurred during the General Mathematics exam on Wednesday, with the objective paper not finishing until 10 PM. Students scheduled to take Agricultural Science on Thursday were forced to start the exam, which was supposed to begin at noon, at 7 PM. This prompted the Oyo State government to issue a statement titled: “Oyo Govt Expresses Concern Over WAEC Delays in the Conduct of Year 2026 Examination.” In this statement, the Commissioner for Information, Prince Dotun Oyelade, quoted his education counterpart, Hon. Olusegun Olayiwola, as expressing the government’s displeasure over what he described as “the avoidable stress, anxiety, and risks to which candidates have been exposed due to the late commencement of some examination papers, contrary to the approved WAEC timetable.”

The statement further indicated: “Specifically, Government (Objective) and Agricultural Science (Practical) question papers reportedly did not reach many centers until about 6:30 PM, making it difficult for candidates to take the exams as scheduled and exposing them to unnecessary hardship.

“Hon. Olayiwola also revealed that as of 8:11 PM, some examination centers in Ogbomoso and Saki were still conducting the Government (Objective) paper, while the Agricultural Science Practical examination, which was scheduled to follow, had yet to commence.

“The Commissioner noted that a similar challenge occurred on June 3, 2026, when Mathematics (Objective) question papers were reportedly supplied in insufficient quantities to several centers, resulting in delays that extended examination activities late into the night.”

WAEC’s consistent display of ineptitude year after year suggests that the examination body is either overwhelmed by its responsibilities or that its workers are fatigued. The workers have already expressed dissatisfaction with the organization’s inadequate welfare offerings, and it’s no surprise that the examination processes have deteriorated. What remains unclear is whether WAEC can justifiably withhold results from examination halls where students finished writing at midnight or where five or six students had to share a single question paper. If anything unfortunate occurs during the answering process, who should be blamed? WAEC, the schools, or the students? It’s challenging to assign blame in this situation. Therefore, if WAEC cannot enhance the quality of our exams and accurately assess the academic capabilities of our students, it would be better for it to step aside and allow new bodies to take over.

This leads us to another troubling issue that has unfolded over the past three weeks: the kidnapping of students and teachers in Ahoro Esinele and Yawota villages in Oriire Local Government of Oyo State. This incident, the first of its kind in the South-West, has garnered national and international attention. The launch of the Western Nigeria Security Network (Amotekun) in Ibadan on January 9, 2020, was specifically aimed at preventing such incidents as those seen in Oriire. The late Governor Rotimi Akeredolu of Ondo State, who was chairman of the South-West Governors’ Forum at the time, clearly articulated Amotekun’s purpose during a lecture at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife. He stated that the centralization of the security network in the country would not effectively protect the populace and that the South-West had decided to take proactive measures to ensure the safety of its citizens. Akeredolu emphasized, “We spoke about the fact that we are 200 million, and today we have a police command. A nation as vast as Nigeria—what sense does that make? Just ask yourself, if we have a single police command, what manner of intelligence gathering will exist that is different from what we have today? Let me ask my brother here, who is the chief security officer of the state—am I, or is he? The answer is ambiguous. Do you control the police totally? That has led us to create Amotekun in this region, and we are proud of it. We had to take the bull by the horns, despite the opposition. We are determined not to leave our lives and properties in the hands of those who do not wish to protect us. We will protect ourselves.”

Six years after the establishment of Amotekun, can we say the outfit has outlived its welcome? The answer is not straightforward. However, Amotekun’s failure to effectively address the various criminal activities reported in the states is a significant concern. The Oriire kidnapping incident is a severe blow to its credibility. Several key challenges plague the corps, including funding, limited firepower, and an inadequate recruitment model. While the criminals they are meant to confront are armed with AK-47 rifles, Amotekun personnel are equipped with pump-action rifles. It is perplexing why state governments cannot procure sufficient AK-47 rifles and allocate them for use under strict control.

Another challenge facing Amotekun is its recruitment policy across different states. Ideally, the corps should consist of local hunters and individuals with deep-rooted knowledge of their communities. However, many states have opted to recruit ‘English-speaking’ personnel instead. Despite their initial commitment to establishing Amotekun, the governors have hesitated to recruit a sufficient number of personnel. One state, surrounded by dense forests, started with just over 300 men. Only Oyo State approved a relatively large contingent of 1,500 personnel to begin operations. Today, the total number of Amotekun personnel across the five operational states stands at around 10,000—far too few given the vast forested areas.

To effectively support conventional police forces with local intelligence, the focus should be on individuals possessing local know-how, rather than merely those who can navigate the internet. I was informed that a state once sent a team around its local governments to recruit local hunters and those with indigenous knowledge to assist in community policing efforts for Amotekun. However, many of those who showcased their charms and native abilities during the recruitment process were rejected because they could not complete online forms.

The message to the South-West governors should be clear: either run Amotekun effectively or dissolve the organization and let the people rely on the existing federal police and its shortcomings.

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a modern and general interest Magazine with its Headquarters in Abuja. The Magazine has a remarkable difference in editorial philosophy and goals, it adheres strictly to the ethics of Journalism by using the finest ethos of the profession to promote peace among citizens; identifying and harnessing the nation’s vast resources; celebrating achievements of government agencies, individuals, groups and corporate organizations and above all, repositioning Nigeria for the needed growth and development. Time Nigeria gives emphasis to places and issues that have not been given adequate attention by others. The Magazine is national in outlook and is currently being read and patronized both in print and on our vibrant and active online platform (www.timenigeria.com).
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This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. 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Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. 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It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. 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