Cover StoryOpinionPerspectivePolitics

For South-West Governors, Some Home Truths

6 Mins read

Today, it is easy to see different states in the original Western Region competing to own airports, when collaboration to build railways that would transverse Warri, Asaba, Benin, Akure, Osogbo, Ikeja, Agbado, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Oyo, Ogbomoso, en route Ilorin to link the North would enhance trade and transportation. You would wonder why Osun and Oyo cannot build a superhighway that would take people from Osogbo to Ibadan airport in 40 minutes or why Ekiti and Ondo cannot fix a major road to link Ado-Ekiti seamlessly with Akure airport. They can even toll such roads and make more money. You also wonder why states cannot collaborate and seek federal guarantees for offshore financial support to build power plants and produce power for the states in view of the abiku-like conduct of the electricity distribution companies.

Governance in the South-West geopolitical zone started in a different way when compared with the general Nigerian standard, either at the pre-independence period or the immediate post independence, especially up to the Second Republic

When the Western-styled governance model kicked off in Nigeria in the aftermath of amalgamation of 1914, the most popular political front was the National Council for Nigeria and Camerouns (NCNC), which later transformed to National Council for Nigerian Citizens, when the English-speaking Camerounians exited. Dr. Herbert Macaulay (1864-1946) was the political leader who later handed the structure to Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. The NCNC umbrella was going to capture the entire Southern Nigeria until Chief Obafemi Awolowo and a number of his compatriots deemed it fit to provide a distinct identity for the South-West

Alhaji Ganiyu Olawale Dawodu, better known as G.O.D of Lagos politics, detailed the exploits of Chief Obafemi Awolowo and his compatriots who formed the Egbe Afenifere, also known as Action Group in their bid to distinguish governance in the South-West. In his book, *Awo or Zik: Who won the 1951 Western Nigeria Election,* (first published in 1997), Dawodu provided details of how Chief Obafemi Awolowo and his colleagues in the Afenifere sold the idea of a unique governance identity to the South-West relying heavily on the traditional institution.

At the time, the Lagos intelligentsia was already soaked in by the NCNC, thus creating a fierce contest for the Western House in the 1951 election. According to Pa Dawodu, the existence of what is today referred to as true federalism, whereby independent political parties like the Ibadan Peoples Party (IPP) and others operate freely, gave Awo the desired victory. Dawodu, who had joined the AG as a teenager, reported that the leaders of the West were able to convince the independent parties including the IPP, which had won all the seats in Ibadanland to yield their votes to the AG, to ensure the emergence of the unique system of government promised by Awo and Afenifere.

That led to what was wrongly reported in the media at the time as “Cross-Carpeting,” which Dawodu said had no such coloration, because the IPP and other independent political parties, which had won seats in Ondo, Ekiti and Kukuruku Division, who were never affiliates of the NCNC, only decided to give their votes to the AG and yield to it the control of the House.

Following its victory in the Western elections of 1951, the AG instituted a governance model that would define the Western Region and penetrate the psyche of its people as true examples of good governance. The party introduced free and compulsory education and free health policies, among others.

As much as persons of my age would only have read the pre-independence exploits of the AG in the books, we were the direct beneficiaries of the activities of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), an offshoot of the AG, equally led by Awo in the Second Republic. We were beneficiaries of the free education policy, and we saw how the free health policy affected lives positively. We also saw how a responsible and responsive government operates in the lives of the people.

So, today, if the people of the South-West talk about governance, what they really have in mind is the type of governance premiered by the sage, Chief Obafemi Awolowo and his followers in the AG and UPN. One that ensured good life and prosperity in their communities.

Such was the motivating factor that propelled the people of today’s South-West to support the Alliance for Democracy (AD) tooth and nail in 1999, when democracy returned to the country. By linking the party to Awo and the late MKO Abiola, whose victory in the June 12, 1993 presidential election was wrongly annulled by the military to the AD, politicians immediately created instant sparks for the party in the South-West.

One would, however, need no hesitation to conclude that the failure of the AD governors in the South-West in 1999 to replicate something close to what Awo and AG did in their lives from 1951 to early 1960s as welk as the UPN between 1979 and 1983, created a bewilderment that eventually ushered in the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) to a majority of the states in 2003.

Over time, however, governance in the South-West has continued to be Nigerianised to the extent that the avowed progressivism in governance rooted in the region has been practically wiped out.

When I served in the government of Oyo State, I was made to know that the state alone inherited nine farm settlements from the Western Region. I know that each of the states originally grouped under Western Region including today’s Ogun, Ekiti, Ondo, Osun, Edo and Delta also inherited such farm settlements where food and cash crops were produced in abundance. Today, most of such farms are moribund. The other day, Oyo announced the revival of Fashola farms and that it is working on Eruwa Farm estate, but the idea had drifted away from Awo’s original concept where small holder farmers had their space alongside the big players.

Looking at that scenario, you can easily sense why the Western Region under Awo was prosperous and the true pacesetter and why the eight states that emerged from the defunct region are struggling to feed themselves, even as they have to go into huge debts to fix infrastructure.

Today, it is easy to see different states in the original Western Region competing to own airports, when collaboration to build railways that would transverse Warri, Asaba, Benin, Akure, Osogbo, Ikeja, Agbado, Abeokuta, Ibadan, Oyo, Ogbomoso, en route Ilorin to link the North would enhance trade and transportation. You would wonder why Osun and Oyo cannot build a superhighway that would take people from Osogbo to Ibadan airport in 40 minutes or why Ekiti and Ondo cannot fix a major road to link Ado-Ekiti seamlessly with Akure airport. They can even toll such roads and make more money. You also wonder why states cannot collaborate and seek federal guarantees for offshore financial support to build power plants and produce power for the states in view of the abiku-like conduct of the electricity distribution companies.

One, however, has to single out Governor Babajide Sanwo-Olu of Lagos State for doing a good job in that state. His infrastructure initiatives can easily turn the fortunes of the state around.

These days, the Development Agenda for Western Nigeria (DAWN) Commission has been at the head of efforts to midwife a focused South-West and possibly return the prosperity of the region. I dare say that not much result has been seen. The region, which was built with cool money from cocoa and other cash crops today doesn’t have a policy that works for cocoa farmers. Nigeria is already trailing Ivory Coast and Ghana in cocoa production, even when the devalued naira would have guaranteed the farmers some good earnings in foreign currency.

In May, July, and October of 2024, there were reports in the media that detailed plans by the South-West Governors Forum to launch collaborative efforts in the fight against food insecurity in the region. The news items were sonorous in the ears of many, especially, when those reports provided insights into the resolve of the governors to accord priority to the production of rice, maize, cassava and poultry, aside the promise to revitalise the moribund dams in their domains.

At different meetings coordinated by the DAWN Commission, South-West governors gave something that looked like a notice that they were returning the zone to the Obafemi Awolowo era, when farm settlements litter the length and breadth of the old Western Region, making life more abundant for all. They talked about cluster farming and renewed attention to agriculture. A report claimed that the governors had mandated their Ministries of Agric to collaborate in the apparent determination to fight hunger. Months after the first meeting in Ibadan, the DAWN Commission would sadly report progress in October 2024 that “cross-ministerial collaboration was lacking” for the advertised measures including the resolution to have a region-wide Agricultural Data Management and Information System and collaboration for a truly integrated agricultural ecosystem in the South-West.

Rather than holding a series of meetings on the way forward, the states need to take practical steps. Each of the states can start by mandating local governments in their domain to start acquiring land to be allocated to small holder farmers for cultivation of crops and food items the area is good in. The state governments can come in by acquiring land for big-time farmers and assisting with the necessary tools. When it takes a man 20 years to learn how to demonstrate madness, how many years will the madness even stay in his system? That’s a literal translation of a Yoruba proverb, and it should ring in the ears of their Excellencies.

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a modern and general interest Magazine with its Headquarters in Abuja. The Magazine has a remarkable difference in editorial philosophy and goals, it adheres strictly to the ethics of Journalism by using the finest ethos of the profession to promote peace among citizens; identifying and harnessing the nation’s vast resources; celebrating achievements of government agencies, individuals, groups and corporate organizations and above all, repositioning Nigeria for the needed growth and development. Time Nigeria gives emphasis to places and issues that have not been given adequate attention by others. The Magazine is national in outlook and is currently being read and patronized both in print and on our vibrant and active online platform (www.timenigeria.com).
Articles
Related posts
All The NewsCover StoryNewsPolitics

Musa Tsoken Congratulates Kalu on Daily Times’ Lawmaker of the Year Award

1 Mins read
The National Coordinator of the Asiwaju Again Renewed Hope Support Initiative 2027 and National President of the APC Initiative for Good Governance…
Abuja FileDevelopmentEconomyEnergyFinanceInside LagosOpinionPerspective

The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

6 Mins read
  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
Cover StoryNewsSports

Union Bank, AIICO Multishield, Checkers Custard, Others Back 5th Cycling Lagos

2 Mins read
Union Bank of Nigeria Plc, AIICO Multishield, Checkers Custard and other corporate organisations have thrown their weight behind the 5th Cycling Lagos,…
Stay on the loop!

Subscribe to our latest news.

Leave a Reply

WP2Social Auto Publish Powered By : XYZScripts.com