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OBJ versus NNPCL: When Will the Ding-dong End?

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By Taiwo Adisa

I expected former President Olusegun Obasanjo to fire back at the Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited (NNPCL) immediately after it announced the revival of the old Port Harcourt refinery on November 26, 2024. In several interviews before that announcement, the former president had emphatically stated that the refineries cannot work anymore. He had backed up his declarations with his experience while in government, which made him decide to sell the carcasses to a team put together by businessman Aliko Dangote at the cost of $750 million. The former President said he had invited Shell to take over the refineries, and the excuses given by the multinational company convinced him that the refineries were as good as dead. His successor, late President Umaru Yar’Adua reversed the sale under pressure from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). He refunded the amount paid by the Dangote team. With that decision, Nigeria had to go through seasons of anomie at the petroleum supply front as the refineries completely packed up.

Huge subsidies took over the scene, the NNPC and its cohorts took advantage, contractors fleeced the country of hard-earned money through endless Turn Around Maintenance (TAM) projects and the cycle of mystery expanded to a huge gulf. It was a journey that took nearly 20 years, following the total collapse of the four Nigerian refineries in Warri, Port Harcourt, and Kaduna around 2007. It was a journey that practically derailed the Nigerian economy and returned it to a debtor nation after the administration of President Obasanjo had in 2006 redressed that status by securing debt relief and paying off a chunk of the foreign debt. It was equally a journey that stressed Nigerians physically and emotionally, as the citizens went through the excruciating fuel supply crisis with deaths and untold disasters on the tow.

While it would be difficult to put figures to the exact cost Nigeria and Nigerians sustained while the refineries went moribund, it would just be safe to stick by the figures provided by the House of Representatives which said in 2023 that Nigeria had spent $25 billion fixing the refineries in the past 10 years. There were also claims that the process that started in 2021 had gulped about $3 billion. Such funds are aside from the annual salaries, allowances, pensions, and gratuities paid to workers who were left redundant in those refineries and who probably had to earn promotions, and embark on local and foreign training and tours amidst other duties!

At the time death snatched Yar’Adua from the stage, the nation was paying about N200 billion in subsidy. I recall that President Goodluck Jonathan, in 2012 originally budgeted the sum of N280 billion to cover subsidies but when it was obvious that the country would overshoot that figure, former Senate President Bukola Saraki, then a floor member in the senate, raised a motion to task the government on the plan to spend more than the budgeted funds. President Jonathan had earlier that year attempted to end the subsidy regime, which his administration claimed would free at least N1.5 trillion into the public purse. The projection was that infrastructure and social welfare would benefit tremendously, but the political opposition stalled that bid by arranging a series of street protests that engulfed many states.

However, when President Muhammadu Buhari took over on the platform of the All Progressives Congress (APC), the same leaders who had branded subsidy payment a scam jumped the bill from what Jonathan projected at N1.5 trillion to about N11 trillion. The NNPC and Buhari not only paid subsidies, but they also embarked on future oil sales as the administration resorted to resource-denominated loans and all manners of shenanigans that mortgaged the crude that was still hundreds of metres below the sea, thus throwing the nation into a huge economic mess. Even when President Bola Tinubu claimed to have removed the subsidy on May 29, 2023, there were reports the nation still paid close to N5 trillion.

So, when NNPCL announced it was breaking the ice of inefficiency by bringing back the 60,000 barrels per day capacity old Port Harcourt refinery, only its officials were excited. It had to arrange visits of different groups to convince Nigerians. In the last days of December 2024, it also announced the return to life of Warri Refinery. Despite that, the words of President Obasanjo that the refineries may never work again continued to haunt the company. I have also been part of tours of the refineries in Port Harcourt between 2012 and 2013, when the then General Managers gave assurances that everything was set to bring back the refineries in 2014. But no one heard anything positive again as power changed hands in 2015. We were only told the government had awarded another TAM in 2021.

It was obvious that officials of the NNPCL have been upbeat since the return of the 60,000 Port Harcourt refinery in November 2024. It was like the hunter who had taken the head of a lion. One the Igbos will call Ogbuagwu. However, the skepticism has continued to grow because the effects are not seen on the streets. The back and forth around the revived Port Harcourt refinery did not also help the cause of the NNPCL. One day, it claimed to have started operations, the following day, the machines were undergoing recalibration, so the long file behind Obasanjo’s affirmation ‘Can anything good come from Nazareth’ was getting longer, and yours truly was one of them.

The former president did not disappoint when he granted an interview last week and doubted the workability of the revived refineries. Obasanjo told his interviewer: “So if anybody tells you now that they (the refineries) are working, why are they not with Aliko (on the streets)? And Aliko will make his own refinery work. Not only make it work, he will make it deliver.

“Whether we announce our own government refineries are working or not working, look, it is like they say in Yoruba adage, ‘the man who plants 100 heaps of yams and says he has planted 200 heaps, they say after he has harvested 100 heaps of yam, he will also harvest 100 heaps of lies.”

The NNPCL has, however, challenged Obasanjo to join it on a tour of the refineries to see the reformation it has been able to effect. The company’s spokesman, Olufemi Soneye, said that the NNPC now has a business model that has made it a profitable organisation.

He said: “We hold President Olusegun Obasanjo in the highest regard as a respected statesman who has made significant contributions to the growth and progress of Nigeria. His dedication to national development and his right to speak on matters of national importance are both deeply respected.

“In response to his recent comments, we would like to respectfully highlight the remarkable transformation of the NNPC. Today, NNPC has evolved into NNPC Limited, a private entity that has transitioned from being a loss-making organisation to becoming a profit-oriented global energy leader.

“Under this new model, NNPC Limited has expanded beyond oil and gas to become an integrated energy company. Our focus is not only on harnessing traditional resources but also on developing cleaner, cheaper, and sustainable energy solutions to meet Nigeria’s growing demands.”

While we wait to see whether President Obasanjo would take up the challenge to embark on a tour of the refineries, the words of the elder statesman will not stop ringing in the ears-a farmer who plants 100 heaps of yam but claims to have planted 200 heaps, will, after harvesting the 100 heaps of yam, also harvest 100 heaps of lies!

The NNPCL, according to Soneye, said it has returned to the path of profitability. But President Bola Tinubu just told the nation weeks ago that he has been meeting his obligations without recourse to the NNPCL and ‘Ways and Means’. So if the NNPCL’s profits are not contributing to the nation’s wealth, where is the evidence of that profitability? Are we not being returned to Obasanjo’s proverbial farmer, who will have to harvest his 100 heaps of lies? Or is NNPCL’s money toxic, or is it like the gifts by Esu Odara in Yoruba tradition, which gives to the adherents with the right hand and takes back in multiples with the left?

Only a move away from the usually opaque operational system of the oil giant, NNPC, with or without the ‘L’ can solve that riddle.

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a modern and general interest Magazine with its Headquarters in Abuja. The Magazine has a remarkable difference in editorial philosophy and goals, it adheres strictly to the ethics of Journalism by using the finest ethos of the profession to promote peace among citizens; identifying and harnessing the nation’s vast resources; celebrating achievements of government agencies, individuals, groups and corporate organizations and above all, repositioning Nigeria for the needed growth and development. Time Nigeria gives emphasis to places and issues that have not been given adequate attention by others. The Magazine is national in outlook and is currently being read and patronized both in print and on our vibrant and active online platform (www.timenigeria.com).
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The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

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  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
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