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USSD Debt Crisis: NCC Approves Telecom Disconnection of Major Banks over Unpaid Bills

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For years, mobile network operators have been vocal about the strain the unpaid debts have placed on their business operations. As of 2023, the total debt owed by banks to telecom operators was estimated at a staggering N120 billion

  • Sets January 27, 2025 as Deadline

By Abdulrahman Aliagan,  Abuja

In a dramatic escalation of an ongoing payment dispute, the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) has authorized major telecom operators—MTN, Airtel, Globacom, and 9mobile—to disconnect the Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) codes of nine prominent commercial banks in Nigeria. The move comes after years of mounting complaints from telecom companies over unpaid debts for USSD services that these banks have continued to charge their customers for.

At the heart of the issue are longstanding debts owed by these financial institutions to the telecom operators, stemming from USSD services used for mobile banking. Despite the growing tensions, the affected banks—First City Monument Bank (FCMB), Zenith Bank, Sterling Bank, Jaiz Bank, UBA, Polaris Bank, Unity Bank, Fidelity Bank, and Wema Bank—have failed to settle their dues, which, according to the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), date back to 2020.

The news of the impending disconnection was confirmed in an official notice from the NCC, which granted the telecom operators the go-ahead to sever access to the USSD platforms of these banks by January 27, 2025, unless the debts are fully paid. With millions of bank customers relying on USSD for everyday transactions—from checking balances to transferring funds—the disconnection would send shockwaves across the banking sector, potentially crippling mobile banking services for millions of Nigerians.

In response, the NCC has granted the banks a brief two-week window to settle their outstanding payments. The regulatory body, which shares oversight over the telecommunications and financial sectors with the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), also made it clear that failure to comply would result in the permanent forfeiture of these USSD codes. The codes, crucial for mobile banking operations, could be reassigned to other financial institutions that meet the regulatory requirements.

The conflict between the banks and telecom companies has been brewing for some time. In December 2024, the CBN and NCC jointly issued a directive mandating the banks to pay a significant portion of their outstanding invoices, some of which had been pending since 2020. Under this directive, the banks were also required to stop any legal actions related to the debts, and were given clear instructions to settle the outstanding amounts in an effort to preserve the integrity of the USSD service ecosystem.

For years, mobile network operators have been vocal about the strain the unpaid debts have placed on their business operations. As of 2023, the total debt owed by banks to telecom operators was estimated at a staggering N120 billion. While the telecom companies had previously threatened disconnection, their actions were ultimately stymied by the need for regulatory approval—a hurdle that has now been cleared with the NCC’s green light.

According to the NCC’s statement, as of January 14, 2025, nine out of the 18 financial institutions involved had failed to meet the guidelines outlined in the joint CBN-NCC circular. The banks’ inability to comply with the payment directive has left them in breach of the “Good Standing” requirements necessary to maintain their USSD codes.

The telecom regulator has also emphasized its role in consumer protection, warning that customers of the affected banks may soon find themselves unable to access USSD banking services. For the millions of Nigerians who rely on mobile phones for banking, this could be a major inconvenience, forcing many to seek alternative means for transactions.

With the deadline fast approaching, the affected banks are now under intense pressure to resolve the matter and avoid the potential fallout from a disconnection. If the USSD codes are severed, it could signal a fundamental shift in the relationship between Nigerian banks and telecom operators, as well as a wake-up call for the financial sector to settle its outstanding debts and honor its commitments.

In what is shaping up to be one of the most significant developments in Nigeria’s telecom and banking industries, all eyes will be on January 27, 2025—the final day before the axe falls on the USSD codes of the nine non-compliant banks.

Only time will tell if this deadline will serve as the catalyst for long-awaited change or as the start of an even bigger showdown between the two sectors.

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a modern and general interest Magazine with its Headquarters in Abuja. The Magazine has a remarkable difference in editorial philosophy and goals, it adheres strictly to the ethics of Journalism by using the finest ethos of the profession to promote peace among citizens; identifying and harnessing the nation’s vast resources; celebrating achievements of government agencies, individuals, groups and corporate organizations and above all, repositioning Nigeria for the needed growth and development. Time Nigeria gives emphasis to places and issues that have not been given adequate attention by others. The Magazine is national in outlook and is currently being read and patronized both in print and on our vibrant and active online platform (www.timenigeria.com).
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The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

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  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
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