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Africa’s Carbon Windfall: Why Developers Risk Missing a Multi-Billion-Dollar Opportunity

4 Mins read

 

By Chidi Nwafor,

In a rural community in Nigeria, a modest 5-megawatt solar installation hums quietly under the sun, replacing the constant growl of diesel generators. For the host community, the benefits are immediate and tangible: cheaper electricity, cleaner air, and a more reliable power supply secured under a structured agreement.

But beyond the visible gains lies a second, far less understood value stream—one that could redefine the economics of renewable energy development across Africa. Each unit of clean electricity generated by that solar plant displaces carbon emissions that would otherwise have been produced by fossil fuels.

Those avoided emissions, once quantified and verified, can be transformed into tradable carbon credits—financial assets that buyers in Europe, North America, and Asia are increasingly willing to pay for as they race toward net-zero targets.
Yet, across the continent, most developers are leaving that value on the table.

The Hidden Market Behind Clean Energy
Africa is widely acknowledged as one of the world’s most promising frontiers for renewable energy. But it is also, quietly, one of the largest untapped sources of carbon assets. As global demand for credible carbon credits intensifies, the continent’s combination of high-emission baselines, expanding energy demand, and abundant renewable resources positions it as a critical supplier in the emerging carbon economy.

Despite this advantage, industry insiders say only a fraction of African energy developers are structured to monetise carbon credits alongside their core energy projects.

“The gap is no longer technical—it is strategic,” notes Chidi Nwafor, an energy transition practitioner and carbon market advisor. “Developers who integrate carbon revenue early will evolve into platforms. Those who don’t may remain stuck at the level of individual projects.”

At the heart of this divide is a limited understanding of how carbon markets function—and how rapidly they are evolving.

Two Markets, One Opportunity
Carbon trading today operates through two parallel systems: voluntary markets and compliance markets.

The voluntary carbon market allows companies to offset emissions on a discretionary basis by purchasing credits generated from projects such as renewable energy, reforestation, or clean cooking initiatives. These credits are issued by independent standards bodies and represent one tonne of carbon dioxide avoided or removed from the atmosphere.

For African developers, voluntary markets have been the most accessible entry point.

Renewable energy projects—particularly in countries like Nigeria where the national grid remains carbon-intensive—can generate significant volumes of credits. With Nigeria’s grid emission factor exceeding 0.4 kilograms of CO₂ per kilowatt-hour, each megawatt of solar capacity can yield hundreds of tonnes of carbon credits annually.

However, voluntary markets offer relatively modest returns, with prices typically ranging between $5 and $15 per tonne.

Compliance markets, by contrast, are regulated systems where governments impose emissions caps and allow companies to trade allowances. While these markets—such as the European Union’s Emissions Trading System—remain largely out of reach for African developers, they are beginning to influence global trade through mechanisms like carbon border taxes.

Article 6: A New Carbon Order
The real transformation lies in the implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement—a framework that enables countries to trade emissions reductions between themselves.

Under this system, emissions reductions generated in one country can be sold to another as Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs). These transactions often command significantly higher prices than voluntary credits, in some cases reaching $30 to $50 per tonne.

But the opportunity comes with a critical trade-off. When a country authorises the export of carbon credits, it must deduct those emissions reductions from its own climate targets. For governments, this introduces a delicate balancing act between attracting foreign investment and meeting national commitments.
Several African countries, including Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, and Senegal, have already moved ahead with bilateral agreements under this framework. Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, is still developing its position.
For developers operating in the country, the implication is clear: projects must be structured today with tomorrow’s compliance markets in mind.

The Barriers to Entry
Capturing carbon value is not automatic. It requires navigating a complex ecosystem of eligibility rules, verification processes, and market mechanisms.

First is the principle of “additionality”—the requirement that a project must demonstrate it would not have been viable without carbon finance. As renewable energy becomes more mainstream, proving this condition is becoming increasingly difficult, particularly for large-scale projects.

Second is methodology. Developers must adopt approved frameworks for calculating emissions reductions, often involving detailed data collection and periodic third-party audits.
Finally, there is the question of scale. The costs associated with registering and verifying carbon credits can be prohibitive for small, standalone projects. As a result, aggregation—pooling multiple projects into a single programme—has emerged as the most viable pathway to profitability.

A Sovereign Opportunity
While much of the focus has been on project-level development, experts argue that the most significant gains will be realised at the national level.

Governments that establish clear carbon frameworks, secure bilateral agreements, and streamline approval processes are likely to attract a disproportionate share of global carbon finance. In doing so, they can unlock new revenue streams, strengthen foreign exchange reserves, and accelerate climate-aligned development.

Nigeria has taken early steps, including the establishment of a domestic carbon exchange and regulatory guidelines. But compared to its peers, progress remains measured.
The Race to Integrate Carbon Finance
For developers, the message is becoming increasingly urgent. Carbon revenue will not replace traditional project finance, but it can significantly enhance returns—particularly for portfolios spanning multiple sites and regions.

More importantly, it may determine who leads the next phase of Africa’s energy transition.
As global buyers shift toward high-quality credits with measurable social and environmental co-benefits, Africa’s position in the carbon market is poised to strengthen. The question is whether its developers—and governments—are prepared to seize the moment.

For now, the continent’s largest carbon asset remains largely untapped, hidden in plain sight within its expanding clean energy landscape.

* Nwafor is an energy transition practitioner working across renewable energy development, ESG advisory, and climate finance structuring in Nigeria and Sub-Saharan Africa. He is Portfolio Manager at Brendan Nicholas Holdings, overseeing Brenich Ltd, and Founder of De-Lazuli Consult, an advisory firm operating across more than ten African countries on ESG, climate policy, and ESRM frameworks for DFI-backed projects.

Email: chidi.nwafor@de-lazuliconsult.com | Tel: +234 803 676 1032

   

About author
Time Nigeria is a modern and general interest Magazine with its Headquarters in Abuja. The Magazine has a remarkable difference in editorial philosophy and goals, it adheres strictly to the ethics of Journalism by using the finest ethos of the profession to promote peace among citizens; identifying and harnessing the nation’s vast resources; celebrating achievements of government agencies, individuals, groups and corporate organizations and above all, repositioning Nigeria for the needed growth and development. Time Nigeria gives emphasis to places and issues that have not been given adequate attention by others. The Magazine is national in outlook and is currently being read and patronized both in print and on our vibrant and active online platform (www.timenigeria.com).
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The Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: Why Capital Still Fails to Become Infrastructure

6 Mins read
  By Chidi Nwafor  In October 2023, a Gulf sovereign wealth fund quietly closed a $2 billion allocation to global infrastructure, earmarked in part for emerging-market energy and transport assets. The announcement drew the usual applause: another sign, commentators said, that institutional capital was finally waking up to the infrastructure opportunity in the Global South. Eighteen months later, less than a tenth of that allocation had actually left the fund’s balance sheet. Not because the mandate had changed. Not because the fund had lost appetite. According to two people familiar with the portfolio, the constraint was simpler and more uncomfortable: there were not enough investable projects to put the money into. This is not a story about a reluctant investor. It is a story about capital that wants to move, cannot find enough places willing and able to receive it in a form it can underwrite, and quietly waits instead. Multiply that fund by the hundreds of pension schemes, sovereign wealth vehicles, commercial banks and infrastructure funds now carrying dedicated allocations for emerging-market infrastructure, and a pattern emerges that rarely makes it into a headline: the world is not short of capital for infrastructure. It has capital in historic abundance, sitting adjacent to a historic infrastructure gap, unable to cross the distance between the two. The Comfortable Explanation  The explanation on offer at every major infrastructure summit is a familiar one. Global infrastructure investment needs run into the tens of trillions of dollars over the coming decade; committed capital falls well short; therefore, the problem is one of insufficient funding, and the solution is more of it: more pledges, more blended-finance facilities, more climate funds, more multilateral capital increases. It is a comfortable explanation because it assigns responsibility clearly to governments who under-fund, institutions who under-commit, and it offers a clean remedy: raise more. It is also, on close inspection, not what the evidence shows. Pension funds globally hold trillions in assets under management with explicit infrastructure allocations that remain structurally underweight, not because trustees have rejected the asset class but because deal flow meeting their risk and governance thresholds has not materialised at the pace their mandates assume. Sovereign wealth funds report the same pattern. Commercial banks with dedicated project finance desks describe pipelines that look full at the term-sheet stage and thin dramatically by financial close. Development finance institutions, whose entire purpose is to absorb risk that commercial capital will not, routinely report that their binding constraint is not capital adequacy but the volume of bankable transactions their teams can originate and structure in a given year. None of this fits the scarcity narrative. All of it fits a different one. Availability Is Not Deployability  Capital availability and capital deployability are not the same condition, and the conflation of the two is doing real damage to how the world thinks about the infrastructure gap. Availability asks whether money exists somewhere with a mandate that could, in principle, be pointed at infrastructure. Deployability asks something much narrower and much harder: whether a specific project, at a specific moment, has been engineered, structured, documented and de-risked to the point where an investment committee can approve it without exception. The first condition is met, overwhelmingly, across nearly every category of capital that matters to infrastructure. The second is met by only a small fraction of the projects competing for it. The result is a market that looks, from the outside, like a financing gap, and functions, from the inside, like a conversion problem: an abundance of capital on one side, an abundance of infrastructure need on the other, and an underbuilt set of mechanisms in between capable of turning one into the other at any meaningful scale. Where the Conversion Breaks  The break does not happen at the ends of the process. It happens in the middle, in the unglamorous sequence of work that turns a plausible concept into an instrument a fiduciary can sign. A promising transmission project needs a feasibility study rigorous enough to survive institutional scrutiny rather than optimistic enough to attract early interest. It needs offtake arrangements that hold up under real counterparty and currency risk, not the counterparty risk assumed in a base case. It needs environmental and social documentation calibrated to the standards of the institutions being asked to fund it, not the standards of the jurisdiction hosting it. It needs a legal and commercial structure that allocates risk in ways a commercial lender, not only a development financier, will accept. It needs a sponsor capable of executing what has been proposed, not merely capable of proposing it. Each of these is ordinary project finance discipline. None of it is exotic, and in mature infrastructure markets it happens as a matter of course, absorbed into systems built over decades: specialist advisers, standard-form contracts, established procurement norms, deep pools of transaction expertise. What is missing in the markets where the infrastructure gap is largest is not the standard itself but the machinery that meets it. Projects arrive at investment committees with ambition intact and preparation incomplete, and that gap is treated, again and again, as an individual project’s failure rather than what it actually is: a structural absence in the systems responsible for producing investable transactions at scale. The Missing Middle  This is the Missing Middle of Infrastructure Finance: the institutional architecture that sits between capital that wants to move and infrastructure that needs building, and whose incompleteness explains far more of the global infrastructure gap than any shortfall in committed funds. It consists of project preparation facilities able to fund feasibility and structuring work before commercial viability has been proven. Transaction advisers capable of building deals that satisfy development mandates and commercial return thresholds at once, rather than treating the two as separate constituencies to be managed sequentially. Risk-sharing and guarantee instruments that convert political, regulatory and currency risk into something a commercial balance sheet can underwrite. Aggregation platforms that bundle smaller, individually sub-scale projects into portfolios large enough to justify institutional transaction costs. Standardised documentation that reduces the bespoke legal cost of every new deal. And coordination across ministries, regulators and financiers robust enough that a technically sound project does not die in bureaucratic sequencing after the money has already been found. None of these are new ideas in isolation. What is missing is their assembly into a coherent system, deliberately funded and institutionally accountable, rather than scattered across donor-funded pilots that end when the grant does. The African Dimension  Africa makes this dynamic unusually visible, and consequently offers an unusually clear opportunity to correct it. The continent’s infrastructure financing need, by any measure, is vast. Less understood is that the shortfall is disproportionately one of preparation rather than capital. Nigerian gas-to-power, off-grid solar and mini-grid developers have each demonstrated that individual projects can clear the bankability bar; what has not emerged is systemic pipeline scale, a steady stream of comparably prepared projects large enough to absorb the capital already circling the sector. The pattern repeats, with local variation, from grid infrastructure in East Africa to transport corridors in West Africa. Interested capital is rarely the scarce input. Investment-ready projects are. The Global Comparison  Mature markets solved this problem gradually and mostly invisibly, through decades of institution-building that predates the current infrastructure conversation: specialist project finance units inside banks, standardised PPP frameworks, established regulatory playbooks, deep benches of transaction lawyers and engineers who move between deals rather than between one-off assignments. Emerging and frontier markets are not being asked to meet a lower standard. They are being asked to meet the same standard without having built the same machinery, and then being told, when deals fail to close, that the problem is insufficient funding….
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